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1 Introduction
Business intelligence in the form of use and analysis of transaction data is an increasingly
important tool in firms’ inventory, marketing, and pricing decisions. Over a decade ago,
Wal-Mart incorporated predictions from the National Weather Service to overstock its centers
along the expected path of a hurricane with not only flashlights and batteries, but also
Pop-Tarts, as the analysis of sales data revealed that shoppers purchase ready-to-eat food
in anticipation of power outages. Internet retailers such as Amazon.com are able to use cus-
tomer purchase and location information to employ pricing schemes with near-individualized
discounts and bundle offers.1 Outside the retail context, a plethora of airline tariffs screens
consumers by preference for direct flights and time or day of departure, and even by price
sensitivity as revealed by the day-of-week of the purchase (Puller and Taylor, 2012).
The availability of a wealth of transaction data allows firms in principle to implement
the complex fully nonlinear tariffs with volume and/or bundling discounts commonly consid-
ered by economic theorists.2 And yet, in many industries, firms rarely use such complicated
pricing strategies. For instance, consumer packaged goods, such as ice-cream and soda,
come in many equally-priced varieties, as do titles at movie theaters (Orbach and Einav,
2007), despite apparent differences in attributes and quality. Depending on the setting,
such flat-rate pricing can entail significant efficiency losses as exemplified by retail electricity
markets with highly volatile demand (Borenstein and Holland, 2005).
The goal of this paper is to measure the magnitude of foregone rents and the dis-
tributional consequences of such simple pricing strategies. We study the spirit market in
Pennsylvania where, as the consequence of a legal mandate, the state-run retail monopolist
is the largest purchaser of alcohol in the United States and charges the same 30% percent
markup on every item sold in every store, irrespective of local or product demand differences.
Based on an estimated demand system for spirits, we assess the welfare and profit implica-
tions of this uniform markup policy. We compare it to other, more flexible, profit-maximizing
pricing alternatives, not only to bound profit losses from uniform pricing, but also to evaluate
the efficiency implications of and apparent motives behind the regulation. We do so in part
1 See “A different game” and “Data, data everywhere” both at The Economist, February 25, 2010,
and Mikians, Gyarmati, Erramilli and Laoutaris (2012).
2 Recent examples in the theory literature include, e.g., Armstrong (1999) and Rochet and Chone´
(1998) for monopolies and Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) in competitive
environments. Wilson (1993) surveys this rich literature.
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by addressing the implicit income redistribution induced by the one-size-fits-all pricing rule
when customers, as we demonstrate, are heterogeneous in their product preferences.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we estimate a standard multi-product discrete
choice model of demand for spirits. We then use the estimated demand system to evaluate
the profitability and welfare of alternative pricing policies. This requires estimates of the
firm’s marginal costs. Frequently, these can be recovered from markup estimates implied by
the pricing first-order conditions for maximization of the firm’s profit or an alternative social
welfare objective (see, e.g., Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995). We instead rely on wholesale
price information obtained directly from the agency. Thereby, we avoid having to specify the
agency’s objective function, which might – in addition to profitability – reflect distributional
value judgments or attempts to control the important safety and health-related externalities
associated with excessive alcohol consumption. Our estimates allow us to evaluate how far
its stated or implicit goals are from those of a multi-product profit maximizing monopolist,
as we can compare the current profits with the ones that would have been obtained under
profit maximization.
We deliver several results. First, we show that the current pricing behavior of
the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB) is indistinguishable from that of a multi-
product, profit-maximizing monopolist constrained to use a uniform percent markup across
its product line: The PLCB ’s mandated uniform 30% markup is only slightly below the
profit-maximizing 32% markup and the difference in total profits is negligible. Within the
legal pricing constraint, this result suggests an objective function for the PLCB that places
weight primarily on producer rather than consumer surplus.
Given the negative externalities associated with excessive alcohol consumption, in-
cluding traffic accidents, domestic violence, and health effects, it is not surprising that the
PLCB ’s pricing behavior is inconsistent with an objective of total private welfare maximiza-
tion, or equal weights for consumer and producer surplus, as the associated lower prices
would promote consumption. At the same time, with sizable social costs, one might have
expected a pattern to prices consistent with the PLCB placing negative weight on (private)
consumer surplus. We show that were the agency to ignore the correlations between consumer
demographics and alcohol consumption patterns observed in the data, the profit-maximizing
uniform markup is only 21.5%. Thus, if the PLCB had a belief of largely homogenous
consumer preferences, it could have mistakenly concluded that a 30% markup was sufficiently
high to reduce alcohol consumption while simultaneously generating revenue for the state.
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Next, we consider how much profit the PLCB foregoes by using a uniform markup. A
natural benchmark strategy, commonly employed by nationwide retailers, consists of setting
markups at the product level, but charging the same price for a given product across the
entire state. The freely chosen markups across products would then allow the PLCB to
benefit from statewide preference heterogeneity across spirits. We find that the average
markup increases to 42.7% although this single number hides important differences across
products: the average markup for expensive spirits decreases to 26.3%, while for cheap
spirits it increases to 67.4%. Relative to a uniform markup rate, predicted profits increase
substantially by 11.3%, both due to higher average prices of chosen products and to the wider
variation in markups. Total private welfare remains essentially unchanged as profit gains
come at the expense of consumers whose surplus and consumption are 13% and 9% higher,
respectively, under the current uniform markup. This also suggests that if the externalities
of alcohol consumption were increasing in quantity sold and thus decreasing in price, the
easy-to-implement product-level pricing strategy we consider would not only increase total
profit, but may also improve total social welfare.
Moving beyond the aggregate implications for profit and consumer welfare, we then
turn to a nuanced view of the winners and losers of the current simple pricing rule. We show
that the PLCB ’s use of a uniform markup in the presence of heterogeneous consumer prefer-
ences has significant distributional consequences for different demographic groups. Making
use of the rich variation of demographics across local markets, we tie the effects of alternative
pricing strategies to consumer attributes by correlating predicted changes in units sold and
consumer surplus from relaxing the uniform markup rate with observable demographics.
By doing so, we investigate the political economy of regulated alcohol distribution from
a frequently neglected perspective: the current uniform percent markup policy introduces
important price distortions that redistribute rents from the firm to customers, but also
between different customer groups, turning the PLCB ’s pricing into a taxation mechanism.
Such redistribution via taxation is not exclusive to alcohol distribution, but common to many
regulated industries. In the words of Posner (1971):
“. . . one the functions of regulation is to perform distributive and allocative chores
usually associated with the taxing or financial branch of government. (. . . )
Uniform rates, based on averaging together the costs of services whose cost
characteristics are in fact very different, are conspicuous features of regulated
rate structures.”
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In our case, the patterns of predicted price changes from relaxing the uniform pricing
rule suggest that the uniform markup policy results, on average, in the underpricing of gin
and rum relative to whiskey and vodka products. Since we find that low-income and minority
households favor gins and rums, while demand for vodka is driven primarily by high-income,
educated households, the current policy results in an implicit taxation of the latter house-
holds’ alcohol consumption. This is an important result mostly neglected in public policy
debates. We believe that our analysis is the first quantification of the incidence of taxation
induced by a regulatory rule.3 Further, numerous studies have established a relationship
between crime and alcohol prices and access. Thus, a likely unintended consequence of the
current uniform 30% markup policy across all spirits, is the possibility of exacerbating these
negative effects in areas with high crime rates.4
Finally, as a by-product of our analyses, we provide an upper bound estimate of the
foregone rents of simple pricing by investigating a third-degree price discrimination (3DPD)
strategy with prices varying across products and across local markets, here store areas.
Despite the literature’s deep-rooted interest, there are neither general results nor empirical
evidence from a setting with a similar number of markets or products to ours that speak to
the magnitudes of profit and welfare of 3DPD relative to uniform pricing. From Robinson
(1933, §15.5) to Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010), economists have instead identified
conditions for ranking profits and/or welfare in the two settings based on the curvatures
of demand in the different markets served.5 In the absence of reasonable arguments for
3 To the best of our knowledge, the redistribution effects of price discrimination have only been
addressed in the 2DPD case. Feldstein (1971) evaluates the equity and efficiency of a public monopolist’s
use of the optimal two-part tariff to market a service to a pool of consumers with different service valuations.
Borenstein (2012) finds limited redistribution effects of increasing-block pricing in the regulated electricity
market, while Borenstein and Davis (2012) show that cost-based pricing for natural gas entails substantial
welfare losses.
4 Carpenter and Dobkin (2010) indicate that most studies find evidence that higher alcohol taxes
prices deter at least some crimes (see, e.g., Markowitz, 2005). Similarly, availability of alcohol due to
extended opening hours and proximity to retail outlets is linked to minor, property and violent crimes
(Gyimah-Brempong, 2001; Heaton, 2012), with evidence of significantly more pronounced effects in low
socioeconomic status neighborhoods (Teh, 2008).
5 A number of additional results exist on the sign, but not the magnitude, of the overall welfare effect.
Schmalensee (1981) proves that if a monopolist faces constant marginal costs and independent demands
in separate markets, welfare increases with 3DPD provided overall output increases relative to uniform
pricing, a result Katz (1983) later also established for 2DPD . Varian (1985) and Schwartz (1990) broaden
Schmalensee’s result to the cases of interdependent demands with non-decreasing marginal costs and of
a general cost function that depends only on total output, respectively. Mauleg (1983) and Mauleg and
Snyder (2006) explore related demand shape restrictions to derive bounds for the changes in welfare and
profit, respectively, from moving to 3DPD .
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restricting the shape of demands, however, only a case-specific evaluation appears suitable.
Our results show small, 4.2% incremental profit gains of 3DPD relative to product-specific
pricing. Accounting for the possibility of arbitrage across stores and for the managerial costs
of implementing such a complex strategy given the sheer number of products and markets
would likely erode much of these gains. Thus, our results support the profitable use of simple
pricing strategies in an environment that is on its face conducive to segmentation.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the current regulation of the dis-
tribution of alcoholic beverages in Pennsylvania and reports descriptive evidence supporting
the existence of heterogeneous preferences for liquor consumption along demographic dimen-
sions such as race, education, and income. Section 3 introduces the PLCB store level sales
data, presents a standard model of discrete choice demand, and discusses estimation details
including parameter identification and our choice of instruments to address the possibility
of spirit price endogeneity. Section 4 reports the estimates for our primary and alternative
demand model specifications that together investigate the robustness of our results. We
use the estimates in section 5 to compute optimal prices under alternative institutional
pricing rules and to relate welfare changes from moving to such prices to observable local
socioeconomic information. Evaluating these counterfactuals allows us to conclude that
within the constraints of its regulation, the PLCB behaves similarly to a profit maximizing,
multi-product monopolist; that increased profitability from complex price discrimination
schemes is limited; and that – abstracting from safety, health, or any other externalities
induced by alcohol consumption – the current system acts as a taxing scheme on high-income
households by lowering prices on their favored spirits only marginally compared to the
average product. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Pennsylvania Liquor Market
Following Prohibition, Pennsylvania adopted one of the tightest regulations for the distri-
bution and sale of alcoholic beverages of the 18 so-called control states that hold state
6 In environments with asymmetric information, when second-degree price discrimination (2DPD) is
used, Wilson (1993, §8.3) shows that a small number of tariff options can capture most of the surplus and
Rogerson (2003) establishes that a single two-part tariff captures over 75% of total surplus. In the context of
multi-product settings, Armstrong (1999) proves that a cost-based two-part tariff is asymptotically efficient
and extracts almost the full surplus when a monopolist sells a sufficiently large number of products. On the
empirical front, Chu, Leslie and Sorensen (2011) conclude that simple tariffs based on bundle sizes closely
approximate the profits from mixed bundling.
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monopolies over the distribution and/or retail of liquor. The PLCB acts as a monopolist
in the wholesale and retail distribution of wine and spirits,7 directly operating a system of
624 state-run stores (as of January 2005) spread across the state.8 More interestingly for
the purpose of the present paper, the PLCB enforces a centralized pricing system where all
wines and spirits are subject to a uniform percent markup.9
This section describes the main features of the PLCB ’s pricing and presents descrip-
tive evidence supporting the existence of heterogeneous preferences for liquor by different
demographic groups. This serves as the point of departure of our research: if consumers are
indeed heterogeneous, a uniform pricing rule across products regardless of their demand elas-
ticities might overprice some spirits, relative to a more flexible pricing rule, and underprice
others, thus leading to an implicit redistribution of income across households.
2.1 Current Pricing
The Pennsylvania State Legislature exerts regulatory control over several aspects of the daily
operations of the stores. Most notably, as per the Pennsylvania Liquor Code (47 P.S. §1-101
et seq.) and the Pennsylvania Code Title 40, the legislature imposes a uniform markup rule
upon the prices that the PLCB charges both across products and across stores. Prices of
wine and spirits are thus identical across the state. The legislature prescribes applying a
30% markup and an 18% liquor tax to the wholesale price, cw. Accordingly, the retail price
p of a given product is calculated as p = (cw×1.3+bottle fee)×1.18, where the bottle fee is
a handling charge that amounts to $1.20 for the products we consider.10 An additional 6%
Pennsylvania sales tax is then applied to the posted price to generate the final price paid by
the consumer. Table 1 reports the average 2005 prices of the spirit varieties that we study
in this paper by spirit type.
7 The PLCB also operates a privatized system for the sale of beer, allowing the controlled entry of
private retailers.
8 See Seim and Waldfogel (2013, §2) for a detailed account of the welfare loses induced by the very
limited entry allowed in the wine and spirit segment of the Pennsylvania market.
9 This is but one type of price regulation. Corts (1995), for example, focuses on the price distortions
induced by policies that impose a cap on a subset of a regulated monopolist’s products classified as basic or
essential to consumers.
10 The only exception to the prescribed 30% markup are price reductions authorized for products –
typically wines – that the PLCB is in the process of removing from its product catalog once inventory has
fallen to sufficiently low levels.
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Table 1: Prices by Spirit Type
Spirit Type Avg Median SD Min Max
gin 14.32 10.99 6.36 5.99 28.99
rum 12.35 12.49 2.74 5.49 21.99
tequila 20.77 18.99 7.71 11.99 52.99
vodka 15.71 13.99 5.54 5.69 30.99
whiskey 15.72 13.99 6.88 4.99 42.99
all products 15.16 13.49 6.07 4.99 52.99
Source: PLCB . Sales-weighted dollar averages of Pennsylvania liquor prices in 2005.
The PLCB has limited ability to depart from this uniform percent markup rule. It
operates seven outlet stores close to the state’s borders, in an effort to address the border bleed
of consumers who illegally import lower-priced products into Pennsylvania from neighboring
states. While these stores offer wines and spirits at discounted prices, the PLCB remains
within the uniform markup policy by selling products in the outlet stores not found in regular
stores, for example multi-packs or unusual bottle sizes for a particular product. Controlling
for these stores has little qualitative or quantitative effects on our results (related robustness
checks are reported in Appendix B).
Due to the legislated pricing formula, any retail price changes originate in wholesale
pricing decisions of the PLCB ’s suppliers – the distillers. The PLCB purchases spirits
directly from manufacturers. A new product’s wholesale price remains fixed for one year
after introduction. For established products, the PLCB adjust prices to accommodate cost
increases on a quarterly basis, rotating through product categories according to preset sched-
ules every reporting period, which are four-week long accounting periods typically beginning
on a Thursday in the middle of the month. Requests for cost increases must be submitted
three months ahead of the proposed date on which the cost increase becomes effective,
while the less common cost decreases may be submitted at any time and are effective when
approved by the PLCB . Thus each reporting period, the wholesale price of a subset of
products is adjusted, translating into changes in the retail price.
Distillers also have the authority to temporarily change their wholesale price via a
vendor allowance. These price changes are typically reductions that the PLCB simply passes
on to consumers in the form of monthly sales. The sale prices are available in all stores for
28-day periods beginning on the Monday closest to the end of the month. Distillers can
change their wholesale prices in this fashion up to four times a year, or once per quarter, but
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require the board’s approval approximately five months before the proposed price reduction.
A product can thus go on sale for one month, but not for two in a row. The monthly sales are
a useful source of inter-temporal variation in prices that we exploit below in the estimation
of our demand model.
Table 2: Characteristics of Spirit Sales
Percentage Frequency
Spirit Type On Sale Of Sales
gin 61.9 3.2
rum 79.5 3.0
tequila 82.8 3.4
vodka 91.2 3.0
whiskey 77.8 2.9
cheap 79.2 3.0
expensive 83.3 3.0
all products 81.2 3.0
Source: PLCB . “Percentage On Sale” is the percentage of prod-
ucts that go on sale at least once in 2005. “Frequency of Sales”
is the average number of times a product goes on sale during the
year.
Table 2 shows that products are on sale an average of three times a year, just short
of the maximum four allowed by the PLCB ’s pricing procedures. Sales are not rare events:
over 80% of spirits are on sale at least once in 2005. This is true across spirit types, with
vodka and expensive varieties being more frequently on sale than the rest. Table 3 further
documents the seasonal pattern of sales across spirit types by tabulating the average share
of products on sale in a given spirit category and quarter. For example, 10% of gins are
on-sale in the spring. Spirits are more likely to go on sale during summer and winter.
Table 3: Seasonal Patterns of Spirit Sales
Percent of Products On-Sale
Quarter gin rum tequila vodka whiskey
spring 10.0 16.0 17.1 16.5 11.8
summer 18.3 19.5 28.4 23.5 21.4
fall 11.7 15.1 14.8 14.7 12.1
winter 19.1 20.6 20.7 21.5 20.6
year 15.5 17.9 20.2 19.0 16.6
In summary, prices can change at two discrete times per month, either due to a
permanent adjustment in the wholesale price at the beginning of a reporting period, or due
to a temporary wholesale price adjustment at the end of the month.
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Table 4: Ratio of Retail Prices in State Relative to Pennsylvania
Spirit Type ME MI NC OH VT VA
gin 1.00 0.97 0.91 0.96 0.95 1.05
rum 1.02 1.02 0.96 1.03 0.98 1.10
tequila 1.05 1.10 1.05 1.05 1.09 1.12
vodka 1.13 1.09 1.03 1.01 1.05 1.22
whiskey 1.05 1.04 0.99 1.01 0.98 1.10
all products 1.06 1.05 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.13
Authors’ calculations of non-weighted average ratios using 2005 monthly prices of 250
spirit varieties reported by National Alcohol Beverage Control Association (2005).
How do the price levels documented in Table 1 compare to other states? Despite
common beliefs among Pennsylvanians, there is only limited evidence that the PLCB ’s
pricing policies lead to systematically higher prices in Pennsylvania across the full spectrum
of products. According to data from the National Alcohol Beverage Control Association
(2005), alcohol markups in Pennsylvania are in line with those in other control states, ranging
from 17.6% in the case of Wyoming to 64.5% in Utah.11 We also use data from NABCA to
compute the average of the ratio of 2005 prices for 250 spirit varieties in six control states
relative to Pennsylvania’s. Table 4 shows that Pennsylvania’s prices are comparable and
frequently somewhat lower than those in the other control states.
2.2 Evidence of Heterogeneity of Preferences for Liquor
The premise behind our analysis is that the PLCB could perform better using a less restric-
tive pricing strategy than a single uniform percent markup across all spirits and geographic
markets. If arbitrage is avoidable and segmenting costs not too onerous, charging different
markups for different products and individuals will result in a profit increase as pricing is
better tailored to consumers’ heterogeneous preferences, e.g., Wilson (1993, §5). But, are
Pennsylvanians’ preferences for alcohol heterogeneous enough to justify such practices? And
if that is the case, on what dimensions do they differ?
In Section 3.2 below we describe how we allocate census blocks to each store in order
to define the market served by each liquor store and the demographics of their potential
11 We are unaware of systematic information to compare Pennsylvania’s prices to those in the possibly
more similar open states in close proximity to Pennsylvania. Data compiled for the ACCRA (2008) cost
of living index provides some anecdotal evidence that prices are indeed higher in Pennsylvania: a 1.5 liter
bottle of Livingston Cellars retailed for $7.99 in Pennsylvania, compared to a median price of $6.99 in the
sample of 37 cities in neighboring states, with prices in all but one city being below Pennsylvania’s.
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Figure 1: Consumption Patterns Across Demographics
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customers. It is then possible to cross-tabulate spirit consumption with observable market
demographics to highlight differentiated consumption patterns. We do so using data from
the PLCB on 2005 product-level sales by store aggregated to the spirit type. Figure 1 makes
use of this information by ranking markets according to income levels, education, or the
presence of minorities.
Results show that consumer preferences for different types of spirits are indeed het-
erogeneous. Panel (a) in Figure 1 shows the market shares of sales of five categories of spirits
as we increase the presence of minorities (i.e., non-white population) in the store market
area. It is evident that minorities favor gin and rum over whiskey and vodka. In markets
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where minorities only represent about 10% of the population, gin reaches 7.7% of total spirit
sales and rum 18.0%. However, in those markets where minorities amount to 90% of the
population the share of gin climbs to 23.5% and rum to 35.3%. In these same markets,
vodka amounts to 22.4% of spirit sales and whiskey just 16.1%. These shares almost double
in predominantly white neighborhoods: the market share of vodka is 37.9% and whiskey
31.0% in markets where 90% of the population is white. Repeating the analysis, Panel (b)
shows that college educated consumers strongly favor vodka over any other spirit type, while
Panel (c) shows that this preference for vodka is more clearly defined in markets where most
potential customers are high income earners with household incomes above $50,000.
Table 5: Product Choice Set Comparison: Low and High Income Markets
Bottom Income Decile Top Income Decile
Spirit Type Products Price Share Products Price Share
gin 11.88 11.68 14.50 13.64 16.85 8.00
rum 23.27 12.51 28.27 24.69 12.76 14.17
tequila 9.33 20.25 3.75 15.18 21.85 6.43
vodka 38.88 15.54 27.52 48.40 16.61 43.39
whiskey 38.03 14.64 25.96 48.83 18.12 28.01
all products 117.90 14.07 100.00 148.80 16.85 100.00
Statistics based on markets with average annual household income either less than $31,020 (Bottom) or more
than $74,400 (Top). “Products” reports the average number of products available in each category. Average
price are sales-weighted. “Share” denotes the share of each spirit type based on sales of 750ml bottles.
Panel (d) in Figure 1 focuses on a different issue: even when they purchase the same
type of spirit, high income customers strongly favor more expensive varieties.12 Thus, we
expect the elasticity of demand for spirits to vary with income. Table 5 characterizes the
markets at the top and bottom decile of the income distribution in more detail. Relative to
the poorest markets, aﬄuent consumers purchase a substantially larger number of higher-
priced spirit products at an almost $3 higher average price per bottle. Average prices paid
for rum are almost identical across income groups and only $1 higher for tequila and vodka,
but the difference reaches $3.50 for whiskey and exceeds $5 for gin, one of the least favored
categories among aﬄuent consumers (compare the 8.03% and 13.38% market shares to those
of most other categories). Table W.4 in the Web Appendix lists the top ten products
purchased by customers of these two income segments, suggesting that consumers differ not
only in their preferred spirit type, but also in their choices of specific products.
12 Each product’s price relative to the median of the non-weighted price distribution within the spirit
type determines whether a product is categorized as cheap or expensive within its spirit type.
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We conclude that consumer preferences are substantially heterogeneous not only
across spirit types, but even within them. It is not only that white and educated customers
disproportionately purchase vodka over gin and rum, but also that higher income earners
purchase more expensive products across all spirit types. A one-size-fits-all pricing policy
cannot fully target such heterogeneity in tastes and is thus going to imply some surplus
redistribution across demographic groups. The extent of this redistribution is difficult to
assess conclusively using observed consumption patterns and prices only. For example, while
currently, there is a gap between markups paid by high and low-income households, this
evidence does allow the conclusion that current prices favor low-income households, relative
to the prices they would pay under less restrictive pricing rules. This requires, instead, an
assessment of different household types’ responsiveness to different possible price vectors
that can then be used to compare current markup and price differences between consumer
segments of interest to those generated by alternative pricing policies. The rest of the paper
aims to first quantify preference differences and then perform this comparison.
3 Demand Estimation
We want to evaluate potential foregone profits, welfare changes, and the sign and size of the
rent redistribution implied by the current uniform pricing strategy. This requires a model of
consumer demand that can be used to consistently estimate demand responses to alternative
prices. We follow the large literature on discrete-choice demand system estimation using
aggregate market share data, e.g., Berry (1994), Berry et al. (1995), and Nevo (2001), in
modeling demand for spirits as a function of product characteristics and prices, as well as the
distribution of consumer demographics. This facilitates the estimation of own and cross-price
elasticities for a large-dimensional set of differentiated products. More importantly, when
combined with cost information, it allows us to determine the profit maximizing prices of
spirits under alternative pricing rules to the one currently employed by the PLCB .
We note upfront that in estimation, we do not use the firm’s first-order optimality
conditions that are typically relied on to recover marginal costs consistent with the observed
prices and profit maximization. The inclusion of these first-order conditions in estimation
ensures elastic demand estimates consistent with optimal pricing by a seller with market
power. Instead, as we described above, we obtained information on wholesale prices, cw,
from the PLCB directly. By estimating price responses using the demand side only, we can
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verify ex-post whether our parameter estimates imply elastic demands, in light of the fact
that the PLCB ’s objective may not be pure profit maximization.
In this section we first briefly describe the standard model of discrete-choice demand
estimation of Berry et al. (1995) –BLP hereafter– tailored to the specific features of our
setting. We then describe our data, provide details of our estimation approach and discuss
the empirical sample variation that allows us to identify the parameters of our model.
3.1 A Discrete Choice Model of Demand for Spirits
We specify a consumer’s choice between a set of Jlt differentiated spirits. At time t, consumer
i in market l obtains the following indirect utility from consuming spirit j:
uijlt = xjβ
∗
i + α
∗
i pjt + γht + ξj +∆ξjt + ζjlt + ijlt ,
where i = 1, . . . ,Ml; j = 1, . . . , Jlt; l = 1, . . . , L; t = 1, . . . , T .
(1)
In Equation (1), xj denotes a vector of n observed product characteristics. These are
identical in all markets l where the product is available and are fixed over time, although
the availability of different spirits changes over time due to new product introductions or
product removals or due to the seasonal availability of particular products. In addition ht
denotes an indicator of whether period t coincides with the end-of-year holiday season from
Thanksgiving to the New Year, while pjt measures product j’s price at time t. In accordance
with the PLCB ’s pricing mandate, the price does not vary across markets l. We further
include a constant product valuation, ξj, in utility.
We introduce variation in the valuation of product j over time through common
state-wide deviations from ξj, ∆ξjt, that capture seasonal preferences for different products
at different times of the year beyond the demand shifter for holidays. We further include
unobserved market demand shocks for product j at time t in market l, ζjlt. These capture
demand drivers such as the product’s shelf placement, a store manager’s expertise, or local
promotion activities, e.g., spirits/wine tastings. We assume that these demand shifters are
known to customers at the time of their purchase occasion in period t. As we discuss above,
wholesale price adjustments take effect with significant delay from when these are agreed
upon, approximately five months in the case of product sales. Consequently, we assume
that the distillers and the PLCB do not know ζjlt at the time when they agree on wholesale
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price changes and manufacturer’s promotions. We treat these demand shocks as mean-zero,
i.i.d. deviations from the statewide shock, ∆ξjt. In contrast to ζjlt, we assume that the
latter is reflected in the manufacturers’ pricing decisions. Lastly, ijlt denotes consumer i’s
unobserved preferences for product j, which we assume to be distributed Type-I extreme
value across all products Jlt.
To allow for individual heterogeneity in response to spirit prices and characteristics,
we model the distribution of consumer preferences over characteristics and prices as multi-
variate normal with a mean that shifts with consumer attributes:(
α∗i
β∗i
)
=
(
α
β
)
+ΠDil + Σνil , νil ∼ N(0, In+1) . (2)
Consumer i in market l is characterized by one unobserved and a d vector of observed
demographic attributes, Dil and νil. Π is a (n+1)×d matrix of coefficients that measures the
effect of observable individual attributes on the consumer valuation of spirit characteristics,
while Σ measures the covariance in unobserved preferences across characteristics. Allow-
ing for the resulting random coefficients generates correlations in utilities for the various
product alternatives, thus relaxing the restrictive substitution patterns generated by the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property of the logit model.
Because of the aggregate, store-level nature of our data, we make the common as-
sumption that during a particular time period, each consumer selects either one 750ml bottle
of the Jlt spirits available in her market, or opts not to purchase any spirit for off-premise
consumption, i.e., chooses the outside option denoted by j = 0 with zero mean utility.13 We
define the set of individual-specific characteristics leading to the optimal choice of spirit j
as:
Ajt (x·, p·t, ξ·t; θ) = {(Dil, νil, ·lt) |uijlt ≥ uiklt ∀k = 0, 1, . . . , Jlt} , (3)
13 Nevo (2000, p.401) discusses the potential limitations of the present discrete choice approach with
aggregate market data when in practice individuals purchase several products in a single store visit or at
different consumption spells within a pricing period. Using the same data set as in this paper, Seim and
Waldfogel (2013) present suggestive evidence that the aggregate demand for alcoholic beverages does not
respond to price declines more strongly than average for stores that serve a dispersed population with higher
distances and travel costs to the store and whose customers have a higher incentive to buy larger quantities
or assortments. If such consumer behavior were important, Hendel (1999) shows that assuming single-unit
purchases could understate the own and cross-price elasticities of demand in the case of assortment decisions,
but overstate own-price elasticities in the case of stockpiling as in Hendel and Nevo (2006). In our data, we
find no evidence of stockpiling on aggregate or within markets of similar income.
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summarizing all model parameters by θ. We follow the literature in decomposing the
deterministic portion of the consumer’s indirect utility into a common part shared across
consumers, δjlt, and an idiosyncratic component, µijlt. These mean utilities of choosing
product j and the idiosyncratic deviations around them are given by:
δjlt = xjβ + γht + αpjt + ξj +∆ξjt + ζjlt , (4a)
µijlt =
(
xj pjt
)
(ΠDil + Σνil) . (4b)
In estimating the model, we take advantage of the additive specification of normally-
distributed deviations from mean utility and extreme-value random shocks to integrate
over the distribution of it giving rise to Ajt analytically. The probability that consumer
i purchases product j in market l in period t is then given by:
sijlt =
exp (δjlt + µijlt)
1 +
∑
k∈Jlt
exp(δklt + µiklt)
. (5)
Deriving product j’s aggregate market share in each location requires integrating over the
distributions of observable and unobservable consumer attributes Dil and νil, which we
denote by PD(Di) and Pν(νi), respectively. Thus, the model predicts a market share for
product j in market l at time t of:
sjlt =
∫
νl
∫
Dl
sijltdPD(Di)dPν(νi) . (6)
3.2 Data Description
We obtained a store-level panel data set from the PLCB under the Pennsylvania Right-
to-Know Law. The data contain daily information on quantities sold and gross receipts
at the product and store level, together with each product’s wholesale price, during 2005.
We complement the PLCB data with detailed information on the distribution of represen-
tative demographic attributes obtained from the Census Bureau to evaluate the effect of
demographics on spirit purchase decisions in the absence of individual purchase information.
We aggregate the data over days on which the wholesale price, and consequently the
retail price, remains constant because they share both the same reporting period and the
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same sales period, as discussed in Section 2. This periodicity of on average 14 days accounts
for the strong seasonality inherent in liquor sales, which are disguised in more aggregate
definitions.14
We focus our analysis on sales of 750ml bottles of spirit products. Spirits make
up a smaller, better-defined group of products than wines, thus limiting the size of the
consumer’s choice set to a manageable number of products with non-negligible market shares.
Furthermore, unlike wines, which are critically defined by the uniqueness of their vintage,
spirits are more standardized, are marketed over a longer time horizon, and can be described
by easily measurable product characteristics, such as the type of spirit, the alcohol content,
or whether or not a fruit or other flavor is added. We consider five types of spirits: gin, rum,
tequila, vodka, and whiskey.
We also collected information on five product characteristics: the spirit’s type (gin,
rum, tequila, vodka, or whiskey), the alcohol content, an indicator for flavor add-ons, an
indicator for whether the product is imported, and a quality measure in the form of an
index of experts’ product ratings.15 Table 6 summarizes these product characteristics by
type of spirit for the 233 products that are sold in at least one time period in 2005. The
sales-weighted average alcohol content (proof) is 81%; 44% of product sales are for imported
products; and 14% of spirits contain flavor add-ins. Flavored products are primarily rums
and vodkas. While 100% of tequilas are imported, foreign produced spirits make up roughly
over 40% of gins and rums, 30% of whiskeys, and almost 50% of vodkas. We further report
the average quality score of the spirits in the sample; gins and tequilas are clearly above the
average while rums are, in general, of lower quality.
Within spirits, vodkas and whiskeys have significantly larger market shares, 35% and
31%, respectively, than rum at 21% or gin and tequila, which account for 8% and 5% of sales,
respectively. The differences in product variety within each category mirror the differences
in market shares, with only approximately one third as many gin and tequila varieties as
vodka and whiskey varieties. We also see that imports predominate among expensive and
higher quality spirits.
14 We dropped a number of periods that only last a couple of days due to a misalignment of reporting
and sales periods. This results in 20 pricing periods that span 2005.
15 We obtained the product scores from http://www.proof66.com/, last accessed on March 15, 2013.
We re-scaled the scores to 0 (lowest quality) to one hundred (highest quality).
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Table 6: Product Characteristics by Spirit Type
Number of Market Product
Spirit Type Products Share Price Proof Flavored Imported Quality
gin 20 8.44 14.32 84.93 0.00 41.13 64.02
rum 44 20.62 12.35 79.37 18.33 44.43 39.99
tequila 29 5.13 20.77 79.86 1.43 100.00 58.45
vodka 68 34.97 15.71 80.53 29.57 47.98 52.02
whiskey 72 30.83 15.72 81.50 0.00 30.52 53.01
cheap 120 59.35 11.33 79.69 13.07 27.22 49.72
expensive 113 40.65 20.75 82.74 15.84 68.40 53.33
all products 233 100.00 15.16 80.93 14.19 43.96 51.19
“Market Share” is defined relative to total spirit sales (750ml bottles). “Flavored” and “Imported”
are reported as percentages. “Quality” refers to the product quality score.
Stores differ somewhat in the product composition of purchases. In part, this is driven
by differences in store size: the PLCB operates 65 larger premium stores that carry a wider
variety of products, particularly premium wine, than the remaining locations. Primarily,
however, these differences in sales composition reflect heterogeneity in consumer preferences
rather than differences in the availability of products across stores. Absent store-level
inventory information, we treat a product as being available in a store if it sold at least
once during a given time period. Of the top 100 bestselling products statewide in 2005, the
median store carried 98%, while a store at the fifth percentile carried 72% of the products.16
3.2.1 Store Markets and Market Size. We define the geographic area a particular PLCB
store serves in a given time period by mapping each PA census block group (with an average
population of 1,186) to its closest store based on the straight line distance from the block
group’s population-weighted centroid to each PLCB store open in that period.17 We then
aggregate across block groups to derive each store’s population served in that period.18 This
16 We investigated whether our demand estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of market-specific
demand shifters, such as whether the product is sold in a premium store and/or in a store close to
Pennsylvania’s border with another state, but find no significant qualitative or quantitative differences.
For details, see Appendix B for our robustness checks.
17 The assumption that consumers frequent the closest store allows us to abstract from the consumer’s
store choice problem in estimating demand, focusing instead on the consumer’s choice between different spirit
varieties available at the chosen store. In making this assumption, we follow previous studies using scanner
data such as Chintagunta and Singh (2003).
18 We combine sales and market areas of stores that operate within the same ZIP code to avoid noisy
sales variations across stores that belong to demographically homogeneous markets. The 123 instances of
relevance include both store relocations, where a store moved from one location in a ZIP code to another
during 2005, but the data contain separate records for the store in the two locations, and instances where the
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results in a maximum of 484 store catchment areas that we consider as separate markets. In
some periods, we have fewer markets due to store closures and openings, in which case we
reassign the population to the next closest store. The average market contains a population
of 29,441, but market size is dispersed with a standard deviation of 17,709. Putting all
of this together, our estimation uses a total of 9,530 store-time period pairs (markets) and
1,104,204 product-store-time period observations.
The relevant product market includes all distilled spirit purchases consumers make
for on- or off-premise consumption. According to Adams Liquor Handbook (2004), average
Pennsylvania per-capita sales of distilled spirits amount to 5.16 750-ml bottles annually. In
constructing the total market sizeMl, we assume that every person of drinking age consumes
the equivalent daily consumption rate of of 0.01 bottles for the number of days in each time
period and scale per-capita consumption by the number of people in each market.19
3.2.2 Demographic Heterogeneity. In the absence of individual-level information on the
demographic attributes of consumers, we follow BLP and use the population distribution
of demographic attributes for each of our markets, aggregating across block groups to the
store market. Table 7 reports the distribution across markets of the demographic indicators
considered in our econometric analyses: household income, educational attainment, age,
and whether the head of household is non-white, respectively. Our markets are very het-
erogeneous along all demographic categories considered. Table W.1 in the Web Appendix
shows that these demographics are sometimes highly correlated. For instance, education and
income move together, income is lower for minorities and younger individuals, and minorities
and older individuals are likely to live in large markets.
To implement the econometric demand model laid out above, we generate a pseudo-
sample of heterogeneous consumers drawing from each market’s demographic attribute distri-
butions. In the case of income, we fit continuous market-specific distributions to the discrete
distributions of income available from the Census and generate income draws from these
fitted distributions. Table W.2 in the Web Appendix provides the descriptive statistics
for the parameter estimates of the generalized beta distribution of the second kind that
PLCB operates two stores simultaneously within a ZIP. In addition we drop wholesale stores, administrative
locations, and stores without valid address information, or a total of 15 stores.
19 Our results are robust to allowing market size to vary over the course of the year in accordance
with the seasonal patterns in PLCB sales.
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Table 7: Demographic Attributes of Markets
Percentage of Population
Statistic population minority age ≥ 45 yrs high income educ ≥ college
Mean 29,440.9 12.3 39.1 39.2 24.4
SD 17,708.5 18.0 5.0 12.7 13.8
Max 111,964.0 98.9 52.2 72.0 72.7
Min 2,574.0 0.2 16.5 9.4 3.0
Source: 2000 Census of Population. minority defined as share of non-white population. Income
represents household income and high income defined as household income greater than $50,000.
educ ≥ college refers to the population with at least a four-year college education. age ≥
45 yrs refers to the share of population greater than 44 years of age. Surveys indicate a steady
decline in alcohol use once consumers reach 45 years of age. See U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (2010). n = 484 markets.
we employ.20 To address education and minority status we simulate agents by drawing
from a uniform distribution with market specific cutoffs defined by the percentage of college
educated and minority residents, respectively.
3.3 Estimation Strategy
We estimate the parameters of the model following the approaches put forward by BLP , Nevo
(2000) and Nevo (2001). We employ a generalized method of moments estimator (GMM )
by interacting the structural demand side error with instrumental variables that control for
possibly endogenous prices. In contrast to the settings typically considered in the literature,
the PLCB sets uniform percent markups for all products across Pennsylvania irrespective
of local demand responses or seasonal changes in demand. The agency’s pricing behavior
itself thus does not give rise to the typical endogeneity concerns based on the strategic price
setting behavior of firms. At the same time, though, the PLCB ’s approved prices simply
add a fixed markup to the prices set by distillers. This opens the possibility that spirit prices
are endogenous not because of the pricing practices of the PLCB but because of the profit
maximizing behavior of distillers whose negotiated wholesale prices may reflect the effect of
unobserved product characteristics.
We define the demand error term ∆ξjt, the unobserved common valuation shock for
product j in period t, as a function of the data and the values of the coefficient param-
20 The generalized beta distribution has been shown to provide a good fit to empirical income data
relative to other parametric distributions. See McDonald (1984).
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eters under consideration. To derive the error term, we first find the mean-utility levels
δ·lt(x·, p·t, ht, S·lt; θ) that set the predicted market share of each product, sjlt in Equation (6),
equal to the market share observed in the data, Sjlt. The mean utility level δ·lt is the solution
to the implicit system of equations:
s·lt(x·, p·t, δ·lt; θ) = S·lt , (7)
which we solve numerically for every candidate parameter vector and every market l and
time t. We then project the resulting estimate of δ·lt onto prices and characteristics to result
in our estimate of ∆ξ·t:21
∆ξjt(θ) =
1
L
L∑
l=1
[δjlt(x·, p·t, ht, S·lt; θ)− xjβ − αpjt − ξj] . (8)
The GMM estimator exploits the fact that at the true value of parameters θ?, the instruments
Z are orthogonal to the errors ∆ξ(θ?), i.e., E [Z ′∆ξ(θ?)] = 0, so that the GMM estimates
solve:
θˆ = argmin
θ
∆ξ(θ)′ZWZ ′∆ξ(θ) , (9)
where W is a weighting matrix and we loop through every market-time period combination
to define the objective function.22 Since the effect of product characteristics xj cannot be
identified separately from the constant product valuation, ξj, we employ product fixed effects
in the GMM estimation and project the estimated fixed effects on the observable product
characteristics in a second stage. Appendix A describes the estimation algorithm in further
detail.
3.3.1 Instruments. The structural error term in Equation (8) represents the unobserved
deviation from the mean product fixed effect. As discussed above, we assume that distillers
observe this deviation in the product’s demand and account for it when negotiating the price
of their products with the PLCB . At the same time, the uniform, state-wide pricing mandate
of the PLCB limits the ability or willingness of distillers to change wholesale prices based
on the change in product valuation in a particular regional sub-market of Pennsylvania.
21 Note that we assume that individual locations have mean zero i.i.d. unobserved product shocks.
22 In constructing our optimal weighting matrix, we first assume homoscedastic errors and use W =
[Z ′Z]−1 to derive initial parameter estimate. We then relax this assumption and use E[Z ′∆ξ∆ξ′Z]−1 as a
consistent estimate for W .
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Therefore, we control only for unobserved (to the econometrician) changes in statewide
product valuations across time, modifying the approach in Nevo (2000) and Nevo (2001) to
account for the uniform percent markup rule across stores in Pennsylvania. We employ the
average retail prices of nearby control states in each period as instruments for Pennsylvania’s
price (i.e., 20 instruments). Our underlying identifying assumption is that controlling for
spirit-specific characteristics and observable demographics, valuations are independent across
states, but correlated within a state. Other states’ retail prices are correlated to the common
marginal costs of distillers that serve all states, but are uncorrelated with state-specific
seasonal variations in valuations due to the independence assumption.
3.3.2 Parameter Identification. Identification of individual preferences results from observ-
ing consumer behavior over time and across markets. A product’s own-price elasticity is
identified by variation in prices over time and by variation in the choice set, both across
time and across stores. Wholesale prices are identical across stores, but vary over time as
distillers put their products on sale or as wholesale prices change. The fact that the PLCB
does not change the prices of all spirits or of all products within a particular spirit type at
the same time introduces variation in relative prices over time, which is most useful for the
identification of cross-price elasticities. Figure W.1 in the Web Appendix shows how the
relative prices of a select group of spirits vary over the 2005 sample.
The preferences for product characteristics and for spirit types are identified by
variation in product characteristics that correlates with differences in market shares of spirits
by attribute, spirit type, and by the overall size of the category over time. Individual
heterogeneity in such preferences is identified by the cross-market heterogeneity in the
distribution of demographics. As we document in Section 2.2, different socioeconomic groups
have markedly varied preferences across spirit types and quality within each spirit type.
4 Estimation Results
Table 8 presents three sets of demand estimates. Specification (1) shows ordinary least
squares results of a regression of the logarithm of the ratio of each product’s share to the
outside share. Specification (2) uses the same dependent variable, but instruments for price
using the prices in other control states as discussed above. Each IV is significant at the 95%
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Table 8: Demand Estimates
OLS IV Full Model
Mean Utility (α, β)
price -0.1576 (0.0094) *** -0.2056 (0.0183) *** -0.1813 (0.0088) ***
holiday 0.5807 (0.0135) *** 0.5798 (0.0140) *** 1.0944 (0.0884) ***
constant -8.8880 (0.5082) *** -9.1439 (0.6687) *** -6.3235 (0.2828) ***
proof 2.3658 (0.4796) *** 2.8882 (0.6388) *** 0.8553 (0.2817) ***
quality 0.3380 (0.0706) *** 0.4301 (0.0908) *** 0.0643 (0.0285) ***
flavored -0.6124 (0.1631) *** -0.6794 (0.1986) *** -0.4982 (0.0726) ***
imported 0.8712 (0.1347) *** 1.1753 (0.1655) *** 0.1158 (0.0632) *
gin -0.7713 (0.2626) *** -0.9568 (0.3117) *** -0.0960 (0.0951)
rum 0.1921 (0.1963) 0.1777 (0.2426) *** 0.2750 (0.0851) ***
tequila 0.7283 (0.3568) ** 1.0983 (0.4615) ** -0.2726 (0.1060) ***
vodka 0.3978 (0.2088) * 0.4148 (0.2547) 0.4226 (0.0718) ***
Standard Dev. (σ)
price 0.0015 (0.1145)
constant 0.0138 (0.1738)
Interactions (Π)
income 2.2958 (0.1166) ***
price×income -0.0487 (0.0190) ***
education -3.6162 (0.1610) ***
minority -0.7471 (0.1648) ***
Elasticity Statistics:
Average -2.54 -3.31 -3.32
Sales-weighted Avg. -2.38 -3.10 -3.11
Percentage Inelastic 1.94 0.00 0.02
Off-Premise Spirit Demand -2.05 -2.67 -1.86
First Stage:
F − Statistic 20.418
Percentage Significant 100.0
R2 0.982 0.982
Minimum Distance χ2 (df) 79.0 (13)
Observations 1,104,204 1,104,204 1,104,204
Markets 9,530 9,530 9,530
Agents per Market 100
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses with p-values denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
and *** p < 0.01. All mean utility estimates (α, β) except price and holiday are obtained by minimum
distance, second-stage regression of product fixed effects on spirit characteristics. “Off-Premise Spirit
Demand” is the price elasticity of total PLCB spirit sales (750ml bottles).
level and the set of IVs generates a F-statistic of 20.4 indicating the set is also significant.
Our main specification in column 3 adds interactions allowing for the baseline taste to shift
with income, educational attainment, and minority status and the price responsiveness to
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vary with income. All specifications include product fixed effects that we then, as described
above, project on the product characteristics in Table 6 in a second stage.
The demand estimates are stable across specifications. The price coefficient drops
slightly as we employ instrumental variables techniques, suggesting that distillers base their
pricing decisions to some degree on variation in demand not captured by observables in the
data. Preferences for spirit purchases rise significantly during the holiday period, which
we define to be periods that overlap with Christmas or Thanksgiving. Consumers have a
preference for un-flavored and imported varieties and utility increases in the product’s alcohol
content and quality. Conditional on these characteristics, they prefer vodkas and rums to
whiskeys, the left-out category, but prefer whiskeys to tequila.
Estimates of the interaction parameters Π reveal that consumption of the outside
good is increasing in both education and minority status, but decreasing in income. Further,
demand shifts outwards and becomes flatter as the income of households increases. Thus,
demand elasticities might increase or decrease depending on which of these two effects
dominates at the observed prices. This ambiguity is interesting because theory does not
suggest restrictions for the sign of the relationship between demand elasticity and income.
In some environments, it is natural to expect that the smaller the share of income the
consumption of a particular product represents, the less elastic demand should be. In our
case, we estimate that the average household spends only $28.25 annually on spirits at PLCB
stores (i.e., on “off-premise” consumption) and we might thus expect demand for spirits
among higher income households to be less elastic than for low income households. Our
results suggest instead that at current prices, there is a small, but negative effect of income
on the demand elasticity of spirits. We argue that our results reflect an additional factor that
dominates the income-price elasticity of demand relationship: the variety available and the
closeness of substitutes. Demand for spirits among higher income households is more elastic
because there are more products available in the high-quality product segments that they
typically favor (see, e.g., Table 5). Furthermore, they can also substitute to lower-quality
products rather than just to the outside option.
The income gradient of the price elasticity is small, however: at an aggregate level,
the price elasticity of off-premise spirit demand is −1.57 for markets with average household
income in the lowest income quartile, compared to −2.01 for markets in the fourth income
quartile, and −1.86 overall. This is comparable to estimates in the literature: in a review,
Leung and Phelps (1993) conclude that, based on 15 studies analyzing aggregate data on
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Figure 2: Distribution of Demand Elasticities
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Price Elasticity
Distribution of Product Elasticities: Tequila
(d) Tequila
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Distribution of Product Elasticities: Vodka
(e) Vodka
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Price Elasticity
Distribution of Product Elasticities: Whiskey
(f) Whiskey
alcohol consumption, the price elasticity of demand for distilled spirits is −1.5. At the
product-level, we estimate an average own-price elasticity of −3.32. Comparable product-
level elasticities for spirit products are rarely available in the literature, in part because spirits
are not commonly carried in grocery stores, the most reliable source of scanner data.23
23 For instance, in analyzing a distilled spirits merger, Ashenfelter and Hosken (2010), for example,
have to rely on a ten-city sample of California drug stores and do not find consistently negative quantity
adjustments in response to post-merger price increases.
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The results in Table 9 and Figure 2 encapsulate the driving forces explaining the
result of our counterfactuals in Section 5. For a uniform 30% markup to be optimal across
all products sold by the PLCB , demand elasticity estimates should be roughly identical for
all spirits. This is not the case. For instance, demand for vodka products is significantly more
elastic than for rum products. Yet, all spirits are sold with a common 30% markup, which
suggests that vodkas are overpriced in relative terms, and that there is overconsumption
of rum relative to consumption under a profit-maximizing multi-product monopoly pricing
strategy (fixing average price levels). The current one-size-fits-all policy thus necessarily
benefits different consumer groups differentially: rents are transferred from consumers of
vodkas to consumers of rum.
Table 9: Price Elasticities by Spirit Type
Spirit Type Price Elast Median P25 P75 SD
gin 14.5 -2.9 -2.3 -4.2 -2.0 1.3
rum 12.5 -2.6 -2.6 -2.8 -2.2 0.6
tequila 21.0 -4.2 -3.9 -4.2 -3.5 1.3
vodka 16.1 -3.3 -3.0 -4.0 -2.5 1.1
whiskey 15.9 -3.2 -2.9 -4.1 -2.1 1.3
cheap 11.4 -2.3 -2.4 -2.7 -1.9 0.6
expensive 20.5 -4.1 -4.0 -4.6 -3.5 1.0
all products 15.4 -3.1 -2.8 -3.9 -2.3 1.2
“Price” is measured in dollars; “Elast” reports the sales-weighted average
elasticity for each spirit category; “P25” and “P75” reports the lower and
upper quartile of the empirical distribution of elasticities; and “SD” is the
corresponding standard deviation.
The heterogeneity of demand elasticities is not present only across spirit types, but
also within them. Thus, for instance, vodkas and rums are more similar at the less elastic
segments (p75) than at the more elastic ones (p25). The empirical distribution of price
elasticities is most spread for whiskeys and gins while most concentrated for rums. Notice
also that Figure 2 depicts multi-modal distributions of elasticities for all five spirit types.
Spirit types are thus further segmented into higher and lower quality with different responses
to price changes. The bottom of Table 9 corroborates this hypothesis. The demand for the
most expensive products is more elastic than the demand for cheap spirits. Consumers of
expensive products have closer substitutes including more variety in high-end segments, e.g.,
Table 5, as well as cheap spirits, which are closer substitutes than off-premise consumption.
Buyers of cheap spirits only contemplate the latter alternative, thus leading to less elastic
demand for inexpensive spirits.
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5 Welfare Consequences of Non-Uniform Markups
With robust estimates of spirit demand in hand, we are in a position to address the economic
consequences of the PLCB ’s choice to refrain from using more flexible pricing strategies As
discussed in the Introduction, it is theoretically ambiguous whether price discrimination,
such as 3DPD is more or less efficient than uniform pricing. In this section we compare
alternative, more flexible, non-uniform markup strategies accounting for the nonlinearities
of individual market demands that have hindered general comparisons since the work of
Robinson (1933). Furthermore, we address these questions in the context of a meaningful
economic application where we evaluate the possibility of improving upon the current uniform
percent markup policy of the PLCB .
We employ our estimates from Table 8 as the complete characterization of Penn-
sylvania demand for spirit products. We first use these estimates and the distributions of
demographics within and across markets to compute optimal prices under increasingly more
complex pricing strategies, assuming that the PLCB chooses them to maximize profits.
Based on the resulting price vectors, we rely on the estimated model and the PLCB ’s
wholesale cost information to compute demand for each spirit, markups, and profits, as
well as consumer surplus. A comparison of these measures allows us to determine how
different the PLCB ’s pricing is from variants of a multi-product monopolist’s pricing in
terms of profitability and efficiency. Next, we relate the changes in these economic outcomes
to socioeconomic variables in order to uncover the implicit redistribution of rents – or
cross-subsidization – among Pennsylvanians, as induced by the PLCB ’s uniform percent
markup pricing rule.
5.1 Counterfactual Analysis: Procedure
Consider a multi-product, profit-maximizing monopolist’s pricing problem in several l geo-
graphical markets and time periods t, i.e., the monopolist can set different prices not only
in different time periods (as implicitly done by the PLCB currently), but potentially also in
different local markets. For each time period and each market, the firm chooses a vector of
prices {p.lt} to solve:
max
{p.lt}
∑
j∈Jlt
(pjlt − cwjt)Mlsjlt(p.lt) , (10)
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where sjlt(p) is the market share of product j in market l in period t conditional on prices
p.lt and given market size Ml and c
w
j , the wholesale price of a bottle of product j.
We consider two alternative pricing strategies that place the following constraints on
the firm’s objective function in Equation (10):
pjlt =
[
(1 + λ)cwjt + $1.20
]× 1.18 ∀l , (11a)
pjlt = pjt ∀l . (11b)
Under constraint (11a), the firm chooses a single uniform markup percentage λ,
which maximizes (10). We call this the “Uniform Π-Maximizing Markup” counterfactual,
which aims at evaluating whether the current 30% markup policy is close to maximizing
profits within the set of single uniform markup rules. To make the markup percentage λ
comparable to the current policy, we maintain the bottle fee of $1.20 and liquor tax of
18%. Under constraint (11b), the firm maximizes (10) by choosing product-specific prices
that apply uniformly across the state in a given period. We call this the “Product-Specific”
counterfactual, which is interesting to evaluate for two reasons. First, markups are allowed to
differ across spirits, but retail prices continue to be the same across local markets. This avoids
any possible arbitrage of consumers being able to benefit from arbitrage across local markets
with different prices for the same product. Second, solving this problem is a substantially
simpler pricing strategy than the unconstrained optimal pricing problem; it involves finding
at most 233 prices for every time period. In comparison, the unconstrained problem involves
finding a vector of 55,210 optimal prices across the 484 markets per time period (or a total of
1,104,204 prices across periods). Lastly, and only for reference, we consider the hypothetical
case of fully unconstrained pricing as the most general pricing strategy. We denote the
solution to the pricing problem in Equation (10) “3rd Degree Price Discrimination.” Ignoring
the possibility of arbitrage, it generates the largest profit level possible for the multi-product
monopolist as it tailors prices to demand conditions in every market. Appendix D provides
further detail on how to compute prices under each alternative strategy.
We rely on a number of common simplifying assumptions (see, e.g., Nevo, 2000) in
the counterfactual analyses. First, we assume that the values of the unobserved product
characteristic ∆ξjlt are invariant to changes in price and demand, at least in the short run.
This is reasonable as the suggested price changes only take place in Pennsylvania, while
global demand for spirits likely determines the development of new spirit product offerings
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or modifications of existing products. Second, we continue to hold the utility of the outside
good constant and normalized to zero. Lastly, we assume that wholesale prices remain
fixed under the alternative pricing strategies. This simplification focuses our analysis on the
interaction of changes in retail prices on consumption independent of changes in wholesale
prices.24
Since the PLCB , as a public agency, turns over both profit (in the form of markups on
wholesale prices) and tax revenue (from collecting the $1.20 handling fee and the 18% liquor
tax) to the state treasury, we do not distinguish between these two sources of proceeds in
our counterfactuals. Instead, we find shelf prices that maximize the PLCB ’s profit inclusive
of tax revenue under alternative pricing rules. When backing out markups to compare the
resulting optimal prices to prices under the current markup rule, we maintain the current
liquor tax rate and pricing formula (see section 2.1).
One advantage of a discrete choice model of demand is that we can easily evaluate
the mean impact of the counterfactual pricing policies in any given market. We report
predicted quantity sold, markups, and variable profit under alternative pricing policies given
the estimated demand system. An efficiency comparison requires a measure of consumer
welfare in addition to producer surplus. According to Small and Rosen (1981), assuming
away income effects and normalizing the constant of integration to zero, the mean expected
consumer surplus in monetary terms under price vector pˆ.lt in market l and at time t is given
by
CSlt(pˆ.lt) = −
∫
1
αi
ln
[ ∑
j=0,...Jlt
exp [Vijlt(pˆ.lt)]
]
dPD(Di)dPν(νi) , (12)
where Vijlt is agent i’s deterministic contribution to indirect utility from consuming product
j in market l, or Vijlt = uijlt − ijlt in Equation (1). The mean consumer surplus in a
particular market l results from integrating over the distributions of observable demographics
for that local market, PD(Di), and the estimated distribution of unobservable individual taste
heterogeneity Pν(νi).
24 It could be argued that distillers will change their prices to better accommodate the new pricing
strategies of the PLCB . In Appendix C we repeat the counterfactual analysis allowing for endogenous
wholesale prices. The idea is first to recover the distillers’ marginal costs under the current pricing, fix these
estimates and then compute the optimal vector of wholesale prices for each pricing strategy of the PLCB .
Results are similar to those reported here, indicating that they are robust to the minor wholesale price
adjustments induced by the different PLCB ’s pricing strategies.
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We also report the compensating variation from moving away from uniform pricing,
or the average amount of income necessary to keep individuals in a given market indifferent
between the counterfactual set of prices and the current ones of p30%.t , or
CVl(p) =
∫
1
αi
ln

∑
j=0,...Jl
exp [Vijlt(pˆ.lt)]∑
j=0,...Jl
exp
[
Vijlt(p
30%
.t )
]
 dP ∗D(Di)dP ∗ν (νi) . (13)
5.2 Efficiency and Profit Implications of Alternative Pricing Strategies
The following tables present the results of the four counterfactual pricing strategies com-
pared to the benchmark 30% uniform markup currently employed by the PLCB . Table 10
summarizes what are arguably the most important results of this paper from a theoretical
perspective. The first row shows the size of profits, total sales, the average price of a 750ml
spirit bottle, consumer surplus, and overall welfare (ignoring externalities) as predicted by
our full model demand estimates of Table 8. The rest of the table evaluates these same
magnitudes for the alternative pricing strategies.
Table 10: Counterfactuals Summary Statistics
Consumer Average
Scenario Profits Surplus Welfare Quantity Price
30% uniform markup 53.79 57.89 111.68 8.56 15.39
Uniform Π-maximizing markup (31.9%) 54.38 56.16 110.53 8.41 15.53
product-specific 59.88 50.41 110.29 7.81 18.86
3rd degree price discrimination 62.13 49.12 111.25 8.09 18.90
perfect competition 41.97 94.45 136.42 12.77 13.67
Profits, consumer surplus, and welfare are denominated in millions of dollars. Profits include
liquor taxes. Quantity is millions of 750ml bottles. Average price is sales-weighted.
Restricting competition in the Pennsylvania liquor market has important conse-
quences. Relative to setting price equal to the wholesale price plus taxes and fees, akin to
perfect competition, the PLCB charges an additional $1.72 (about 13%) for a 750ml spirit
bottle on average, which reduces total sales by 4.21 million bottles, or 33%, and consumer
surplus by $36.56m, or 39%.
One possible motivation for such high prices would be an attempt on the part of
the PLCB to use price to internalize some of the social costs of the externalities associated
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with alcohol consumption: the PLCB may care for other health and road safety benefits
to reduced consumption that private profit maximizing stores would ignore. Comparing the
first and second lines of Table 10 shows, however, that the current 30% markup rule is very
close to the 31.9% profit-maximizing uniform markup a multi-product monopolist would
choose and indeed, the PLCB is currently capturing nearly all of the potential monopoly
profits when constrained to charging a single, uniform markup percentage across spirits sold.
That is, even if controlling alcohol-related externalities were an objective, the PLCB does
not raise prices above and beyond the levels that a private firm would choose.
It could be the case, however, that the PLCB does indeed value limiting alcohol-
related externalities but has complemented its simple pricing strategy with a similarly simple
belief about consumer demand. We test this hypothesis by solving for the profit-maximizing
markup conditional on the belief that demand is not systematically correlated with consumer
demographics and is described by the IV specification in Table 8. Our findings support this
hypothesis as the current 30% markup is significantly higher than the 21.5% markup that
would maximize profit under the IV demand specification.
Next, we study the case where the monopolist engages in simple non-uniform markup
pricing. “Product-Specific” pricing would allow the PLCB to charge a different markup
for each spirit in each time period although this markup is the same in every store in
Pennsylvania. Thus, consumers will have no incentive to comparison shop to find better
prices for the product of their preference; there is no possibility of arbitrage. Relative to the
current markup policy, the PLCB could increase profits by a substantial 11.3%. This increase
in profits is achieved by an increase of $3.47, or 22.6%, in the average unit price of a 750ml
spirit bottle, resulting in only a moderate reduction of demand by 750 thousand bottles, or
about 9%. Consumer surplus falls by $7.48m, or 12.9%. However, while consumers now only
achieve 53.4% of their potential rents in the first-best competitive solution, this limited price
discrimination strategy induces little additional efficiency losses ($1.39m or 1.2%) relative to
current prices, thus resulting mostly in an important redistribution of rents from consumers
to the PLCB .
How much price discrimination is too much? In the context of the digital music
industry, Shiller and Waldfogel (2011) estimate the potential revenue increases of moving
to an individualized pricing system to be always larger than any non-discriminatory pricing
strategy. While this is true from a theoretical perspective, it is questionable that such
complex strategies yield large profit increases once we account for tariff design costs. By
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engaging in “Product-Specific” markup pricing, the PLCB has to determine 233 optimal
markups each period. Under “3rd Degree Price Discrimination”, however, the PLCB would
aim at a much thinner segmentation of consumers, now screening them with respect to
their preferences among 233 spirits within each of the 484 local markets in each period. This
requires solving for 1,104,204 total markups in 2005. Our results show this is likely not a very
profitable strategy: profits increase only by an additional $2.25m, or 3.76%, relative to the
much simpler “Product-Specific” markup strategy. The cost of computing this large number
of optimal markups plus the costs of avoiding consumer arbitrage (perhaps by limiting sales
to local residents in each store) will most likely exceed the limited incremental profits that
this complex price discrimination strategy delivers.25
5.2.1 Markups. We can offer a more detailed description of the effect of the different pricing
strategies in order to better understand the underlying mechanism behind the effects of
these policies. Since “3rd Degree Price Discrimination” will be rarely implemented and its
consequences are very similar to those of “Product-Specific” markup pricing, we focus on
the latter and the “Uniform Π-maximizing” strategy, analyzing the consequences of moving
away from the current PLCB pricing practices to easily implementable alternatives that
better capture rents from consumer heterogeneous preferences.
Table 11: Product Percentage Markups by Spirit Type
Uniform (Π-max) Product-Specific
Spirit Type Average SD Average SD
gin 31.9 0.0 50.6 41.2
rum 31.9 0.0 59.6 23.5
tequila 31.9 0.0 21.8 15.1
vodka 31.9 0.0 40.7 27.2
whiskey 31.9 0.0 39.9 31.3
cheap 31.9 0.0 67.4 31.7
expensive 31.9 0.0 26.3 13.3
all products 31.9 0.0 42.7 30.2
Unweighted average and standard deviation of the distribution of markups.
Markups do not include the 18% liquor tax and a $1.20 bottling fee.
Table 11 shows that “Product-Specific” price discrimination results in general markup
increases, with the exception of tequila products. On average, exploiting consumer prefer-
25 Another alternative to reduce arbitrage costs might be pricing within larger geographic areas than
the ones we consider here, such as the zone pricing strategies that are the topic of Chintagunta and Singh
(2003).
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ences for specific spirits would allow the PLCB to increase its markup to an average of 42.7%,
accounting for the estimated substitution elasticities across spirits. Average increases are
larger for the lower-priced gin and rum products than for vodka and whiskey products.
This is consistent with the sizable groups of relatively inelastic consumers of the former two
product categories apparent in Figure 2, relative to the more dispersed elasticity distributions
for vodka and whiskey products.
Furthermore, markups are significantly larger, at 67.4%, for less expensive, lower
quality, spirits than for higher quality, expensive spirits, where markups actually fall to
26.3%, on average. As before, we define cheap (expensive) products as those spirits with
benchmark prices less (greater) than the simple median price in their spirit type. Such a
marked difference is consistent with the existence of well-defined product segments within
each spirit type, as documented in Figure 2 in particular for gins and vodkas. A uniform
percent markup common to all spirits cannot exploit this heterogeneity in demand respon-
siveness fully, trading off gains in profitability from raising across-the-board markups on
relatively inelastically demanded products with the associated losses on relatively elastically
demanded products.
Table 12: Changes in Product Price by Spirit
Type with Product-Specific Pricing
Weighted Average Price Distribution of Price Changes (%)
Product-
Spirit Type Benchmark Specific Avg %∆ SD %∆ > 0
gin 14.5 18.2 12.8 25.4 67.4
rum 12.5 15.3 19.7 15.0 96.3
tequila 21.0 24.7 -6.1 11.0 39.5
vodka 16.1 18.7 6.8 17.4 66.4
whiskey 15.9 19.5 6.0 20.2 63.1
cheap 11.4 14.6 24.3 19.3 96.5
expensive 20.5 21.7 -2.8 9.5 41.9
all products 15.4 18.9 8.0 19.5 68.9
“Weighted Average Price” measures sales-weighted average prices by spirit type in
dollars. Prices are calculated using the PLCB formula and exclude temporary price
discounts. “Avg %∆” is the unweighted average percentage change in prices relative
to the benchmark. “SD” is the standard deviation in percentage price changes relative
to the benchmark within the spirit type. “%∆ > 0” is the percentage of price increases
relative to the benchmark.
5.2.2 Prices. Table 12 breaks down the aggregate average prices reported in Table 10 by
spirit type, reporting percentage price changes and percentages of products experiencing a
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Figure 3: Distribution of Percentage Price Changes by Spirit
Type with Product-Specific Relative to Benchmark Prices
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Distribution of Price Changes by Alcohol Type
price increase under the alternative “Product-Specific” pricing strategy. “Product-Specific”
markup pricing leads to larger price increases across all spirit types except tequila, and,
mirroring the markup increases, has markedly different effects among low and high quality
spirits. While increasing markups to an average of 67.4% leads to a 24.3% (sales-weighted)
average price increase among inexpensive, low quality spirits, the 26.3% markup for expen-
sive products reduces their average price by 2.8% relative to the current uniform pricing
benchmark. Approximately 69% of all prices increase, and nearly all rums do. In contrast,
the average tequila experiences a 6.1% price decrease, though the sales-weighted average
price of tequila actually increases (from $21.0 to $24.7). This latter result is due to the fact
that tequila products are relatively price-elastic (Table 9) so the reduction in price results
in a sharp increase in demand, particularly for relatively expensive products.26 Figure 3
shows that most vodkas and whiskeys experience small price changes, with a sizable share
of outliers. In the case of gins and rums, most products’ price increases are substantial.
26 Figure W.4 in the Web Appendix documents the change in price and corresponding shift in demand
across products and spirit-type.
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5.2.3 Quantities Sold and Profits. Aggregate consumption drops by a modest 8.8% in
response to a move to product-specific pricing. Table 13 describes how quantities sold –
and the resulting profits – change at the category level to generate this aggregate response.
The price increases documented in Section 5.2.2 above reduce consumption of vodka by
7.6%, gin by 15.9%, and rum by 31.2%, while the 6.1% average price reduction of tequilas
boosts their consumption by 46.1%, thus increasing profits in this segment by 34.8% off a
small base. Price increases reduce demand for cheap, low quality spirits by 35.3%, thereby
limiting profit increases to only 0.1% in this price segment. Demand for expensive, high
quality spirits increase overall by an average of 25.5%, boosting profits by 20.3% in this
price segment. Combined, this results in the above overall profit increases of an estimated
11.3% from moving to simple “Product-Specific” price discrimination.
Table 13: Changes in Quantity and Profit by Spirit
Type with Product-Specific Pricing
Quantity Profits
Spirit Type Benchmark %∆ Benchmark %∆
gin 0.7 -15.9 4.4 9.6
rum 1.8 -31.2 9.5 0.4
tequila 0.4 46.1 3.5 34.8
vodka 2.9 -7.6 19.2 9.1
whiskey 2.6 -1.5 17.1 15.6
cheap 4.8 -35.3 23.7 0.1
expensive 3.7 25.5 30.1 20.3
all products 8.6 -8.8 53.8 11.3
Quantity sold is measured in millions of 750ml bottles while profits are in
millions of dollars.
Section 2.2 documented heterogeneous preferences across demographic groups for
different spirits. The varied demand responses to the counterfactual prices across spirit types
suggest that a move toward “Product-Specific” markup pricing has a non-uniform effect on
the purchase behavior and prices paid by different demographic groups. By enforcing uniform
percent markups, the current system thus induces potentially important redistribution of
rents between socio-economic groups, which we address in the following section.
5.3 Taxation via Liquor Price Regulation
Stigler (1971) first articulated regulatory capture, suggesting that regulation mostly served
the interests of the firms in the regulated industry. Peltzman (1976) built on this view to
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consider consumers and other interest groups that may influence the design of regulatory
rules and eventually the redistribution of rents among constituencies through the political
process.27 Although the regulation of the distribution and sale of alcohol is commonly
motivated by public health and safety concerns, our previous analysis shows that the uniform
percent markup rule de facto treats different individuals differently as the elasticity of
demands for spirit products differ substantially across several identifiable groups. Thus,
as first pointed out by Posner (1971), one-size-fits-all policies like the current pricing rule
employed by the PLCB lead to significant redistribution of rents among customers, despite
not being a stated goal of the current regulation.28
Ross (1984) suggests a way of approaching the empirical evaluation of the magnitude
of cross-subsidization by recovering the weight that each group of customers implicitly re-
ceives in the regulator’s objective function. The idea, already explored by McFadden (1975),
is to apply a revealed preference argument and find the weights that the government must
place on different consumer groups’ welfare to render its chosen action optimal. Ross (1984)
shows, however, that in a setting with interdependent demands, such as ours, it is not possible
to derive the implicit consumer weights uniquely when the number of products exceeds the
number of consumer groups. We therefore take a more descriptive approach given the large
number of spirits sold and the fact that consumer groups are not well identified entities, but
instead characterized by the demographics of each local market. In Table 14 we correlate the
product-level price, quantity, and profit changes induced by the “Product-Specific” pricing
strategy in each market to product characteristics and demographics. In Table 15 we focus
on the impact that our suggested pricing policies have on consumers’ well-being by analyzing
the market-level price, consumption, and surplus effects induced by this alternative pricing
strategy.
5.3.1 Projecting Product-Level Effects in Each Market. Table 14 presents the results of
regressing percentage changes in each product’s price, quantity, and the induced profit
changes in each local market and time period on product and market characteristics for
the “Product-Specific” pricing counterfactual. An observation is the price change, quantity
27 These theories of regulation build upon the influential work by Olson (1965) on collective action
and politics. Noll (1989) summarizes the political economy aspects of regulatory capture and Laffont and
Tirole (1993, §11) elegantly formalize it within a principal-agent model of regulation.
28 See Laffont and Tirole (1993, §11.7) for a formal analysis of a political economy model of
cross-subsidization as the optimal response to the goals of interest groups representing the heterogeneous
preferences of different consumers.
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Table 14: Projecting Product-level Results onto Product and Market
Characteristics
Elasticity %∆ Price %∆ Quantity %∆ Profits
age ≥ 45 yrs -0.1574 -1.3266 1.2444
(0.1229) (4.5666) (1.6059)
educ ≥ college -0.7371*** 24.1881*** 3.2266*
(0.1084) (4.6535) (1.4010)
high income -2.1174*** 23.4808** -11.3616**
(0.2119) (8.7609) (3.6520)
minority -0.0059 6.5547 5.8669***
(0.1414) (5.1043) (1.3778)
gin 0.2243 9.3010 -15.3172 -4.0521
(0.4168) (9.4465) (13.5560) (3.6416)
rum 0.6939** 7.2815 -32.0465*** -11.2410***
(0.2296) (5.0048) (7.3027) (2.2513)
tequila -0.8817** -15.2469*** 45.0305 11.3821
(0.2812) (3.9584) (25.1593) (8.5591)
vodka -0.2656 -1.5586 6.9370 -0.7893
(0.2959) (5.4739) (10.0612) (1.8237)
rum×minority -0.4252* 12.4363* 3.5342*
(0.1685) (5.3835) (1.5143)
vodka×high income 0.7029 -35.5235* -7.7599
(0.3996) (14.1004) (6.4430)
holiday -0.0061 14.6270*** -14.0603*** 7.3883***
(0.0302) (0.9161) (1.0159) (0.3239)
constant -2.1336*** 12.5915*** -14.2607* 10.9702***
(0.2207) (3.7188) (7.1945) (1.7653)
R2 0.1645 0.1318 0.1086 0.0847
N 1,104,204 4,503 1,104,204 1,104,204
The dependent variables are: the own-price elasticity of product j in market l at time t under period t’s
benchmark prices; the percentage change in product j’s price at t in moving from benchmark to optimal
product-specific prices; the percentage change in product j’s quantity in l at t in moving from benchmark
to optimal product-specific prices, and the corresponding percentage change in profit generated by j in l
at t. All regressions weighted by sales under the current 30% markup. Standard errors (clustered around
product) are reported in parentheses with p-values denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
Market demographic attributes defined in footnote to Table 7.
change, and the change in expected profit for each product-market-time period triplet. Since
price changes for a given product in period t are the same across markets (and therefore
demographics), we project the set of product-period price changes (4,503) on observable
product characteristics and a holiday dummy.
For reference, we also include a regression model of the product’s price elasticity at
benchmark prices in each market and time period in the first column. This confirms some
of the results already reported: products have more elastic demand in markets with a large
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share of high income and educated households than they do in markets with large shares of
minorities. Across markets and products, the demand for tequila is significantly more elastic
than that for other spirit types, particularly rum.
Prices decrease significantly for tequilas under “Product-Specific” pricing, but are
substantially higher (about 15%) for the average product during high-demand holiday peri-
ods. This latter point hints at the fact the PLCB is currently departing substantially from
profit maximization during those high-demand periods when the 30% markup rule does not
allow it to exploit the seasonal demand peaks.
Relative to the levels under the 30% markup rule, demand responds to these price
changes differently depending on the socioeconomic and demographic composition of con-
sumers in each market. Thus, both highly educated consumers and minorities increase
their overall alcohol consumption although the composition of their purchases might differ
substantially. Consumption of tequila skyrockets following the general price reduction of
this category while consumption of rum falls substantially. Consumption of an average spirit
decreases further relative to the benchmark decrease over the holiday season due to the
increase in price.
Changes to product-level profitability combine the above price and demand effects.
Profitability gains for the average product are a sizable 10.97 percentage points higher during
holiday periods. Profitability changes are also increasing in the share of minority population
as a one standard deviation increase in the share of minority customers (18 percentage
points), raises profitability by 1.06 percentage points on non-rum products. For rums, the
effect is more pronounced since the group’s taste preference for rums offsets increases in
price. Even in minority-only markets, however, profitability on rums falls by 7.71%, while it
drops by 10.08% in the average market with a 12.3% minority population.
Household income has a similarly sizable effect on profitability changes: holding all
other demographics at their mean values, increasing the share of high-income households in
a market by one standard deviation, or 12.7 percentage points, above the mean of 39.2%
results in a drop in the percentage profit gain from 4.9% for the average whiskey – the
category with the largest number of products – to 3.49%.
5.3.2 Projecting Market-Level Effects. The previous section suggested that positive profit
gains from moving to “Product-Specific” prices were limited for products sold in high-income
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Table 15: Projecting Market-Level Aggregate Effects from Moving
to Product-Specific Prices onto Market Characteristics
%∆ Profits %∆ Price %∆ Quantity CV ($) %CV < 0
age ≥ 45 yrs 4.9653 -0.7626 23.3607 -6.3592* 28.9655
(8.1856) (4.8851) (21.2751) (3.0882) (16.7734)
educ ≥ college 9.5391*** -4.3865*** 25.8475*** -2.3732 88.0873***
(1.7707) (1.2754) (3.2372) (1.3541) (6.9017)
high income 0.2749 -1.8167 18.6927*** -3.1322 48.7427***
(2.3065) (1.8726) (4.7324) (1.6214) (8.5870)
minority 5.9066* 4.1157** 3.3446 3.3537** -3.4659
(2.4575) (1.4452) (5.0639) (1.1628) (6.1486)
democrat 3.5887 3.3235* -5.2727 3.9542*** -10.4804*
(2.0181) (1.5923) (3.9541) (1.1937) (5.2918)
churches per capita -4.7582 5.9058 -7.8052 -5.8138* 8.0067
(3.1460) (3.8039) (6.7916) (2.8437) (13.4674)
population density -0.0290 -0.1754*** 0.2727** -0.0618 0.7823**
(0.0507) (0.0344) (0.0846) (0.0351) (0.2649)
constant 3.3511 21.4215*** -29.2903*** 6.3508*** -21.1780*
(3.4256) (2.2390) (8.6610) (1.6323) (8.3229)
R2 0.1783 0.1713 0.3626 0.2170 0.6741
N 484 484 484 484 484
An observation is a market. The dependent variables are: the percentage change in profit, weighted average
prices, and quantity consumed of all products Jlt in moving from benchmark to product-specific prices,
averaged over time periods t, in specifications (1)–(3), respectively; and the average CV from the price
change and the average share of market consumers with a negative CV in (4) and (5), respectively. Robust
standard errors reported in parentheses with p-values denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p <
0.01. Market demographic attributes defined in the caption of Table 7. democrat is the share of the
population registered as democrats as of 2009 according to the Pennsylvania Department of State, https://
www.pavoterservices.state.pa.us. churches per capita denotes the number of establishments located
in the market’s census blocks with a primary NAICS code of 8131 (source: Reference USA) divided by the
market population.
markets, but more pronounced when sold in minority markets. We now turn to the impli-
cations at the market level: how do these patterns translate into which markets - in terms
of their demographic profile - contribute larger profit gains to the PLCB ’s bottom line?
Similarly, while prices increase on average, there is significant variation in price changes.
How does this variation translate into which consumer types are hurt and which benefit
from the alternative prices?
In Table 15, we show results from correlating each market’s percentage change in
aggregate annual profit, sales-weighted average prices paid, and the share of consumers
whose compensating variation is negative (i.e., who are better off), as well as the annualized
compensating variation in dollars for a representative consumer, in moving to “Product-
Specific” pricing with observable market demographics. We include, beyond our standard
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demographics, the additional market characteristics of population density and the political
and religious orientation of residents, as proxies for other profit-unrelated potential influences
on the regulator’s objective function. We also experimented with adding lagged counts of
alcohol-related crimes from Pennsylvania’s Uniform Crime Reporting System as a proxy for
the potential negative externalities of alcohol consumption. Since these data are not available
for all markets, but the remaining coefficients are robust to their inclusion, we suppress these
results for the sake of brevity.
Table 15 presents compelling evidence that the current uniform 30% markup rule
across all products induces significant rent redistribution. If the PLCB were to switch to a
more flexible “Product-Specific” pricing strategy, it would increase prices to products that
minorities favor and thus their average expenditure per bottle, but decrease prices for high
income and college educated households. Both in statistical and economic significance, the
effects are most pronounced for minorities and college educated households; prices paid
increase by 0.74 and 0.61 percentage points, respectively, in moving from the average market
to a market with one standard deviation higher share of minority households or lower share
of college-educated households. These price changes leave demand by minorities almost
unchanged, however, in line with the group’s estimated demand responsiveness. Consump-
tion responses are increasing in the share of high-income or highly educated consumers; a
one-standard deviation increase in their shares is associated with an increase in the quantity
response of 2.37 and 3.57 percentage points, respectively. On net, by switching to a more
flexible pricing strategy, the PLCB ’s profits will increase in predominantly minority markets
because of the group’s limited demand response to price increases. Profits will also increase
in markets with large college educated populations whose more price responsive demand
leads to a substantial increases after prices of their favored spirits fall. Last, prices would
be lower and demand higher in high population density, urban areas. Similarly prices would
increase in markets with larger shares of registered democrats although in this case demand
response does not change significantly.
Few demographics correlate significantly with the average compensating variation
on observable market characteristics. Minorities and registered democrats – groups with
substantial overlap in Pennsylvania – require compensation to make them indifferent between
the current system and one where the PLCB is allowed to use a more flexible pricing strategy,
reflecting that under the current system, their favored products, notably rum, gin, and
inexpensive spirits, are most underpriced. A one standard deviation increase in minority
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share or in the share of registered democrats (18% and 15%, respectively) increases average
compensating variation by 60 and 59 cents, respectively.
This contrasts with the situation of high income and college educated markets. While
the effect on mean compensating variation is negative but insignificant in both cases, we find
that the proportion of consumers who benefit from adopting a more flexible pricing strategy
(last column of Table 15) increases rapidly in aﬄuent and educated markets: 0.49 and
0.88 percentage points, respectively, for every one percentage point increase in the share
of high-income and college-educated consumers. These customers are worse off under the
current system that works as a taxing mechanism to transfer rents from high income and
educated consumers with elastic demands to minorities with less elastic demands for spirits.
Evidently, changing the current pricing rule would have non-uniform effects both
across and within racial or socioeconomic groups. Table 15 only documents the correlation
of these demographic attributes with the average compensating variation in each market,
but does not speak to the distributional implications for the well-being of older, college-
educated, high-income, and minority populations. In order to document these disparate
effects, we classify markets according to age, education, income, and minority levels relative
to the median across Pennsylvania. In Table 16 we report the descriptive statistics for the
distribution of compensating variation in each of these market types.29
Table 16: Compensating Variation by Market’s Demographic Type
Market Type Avg ($) Median ($) %CV < 0
age < Median 4.10 2.11 8.89
≥ Median 3.07 1.77 11.16
college < Median 2.76 1.67 12.18
≥ Median 4.62 2.30 7.34
income < Median 4.17 2.38 1.83
≥ Median 3.13 1.56 17.10
minority < Median 2.82 1.58 12.52
≥ Median 4.45 2.44 7.28
All 3.62 1.94 9.95
An observation is average compensating variation in a market. Markets are classified based
on how their average demographic attributes compare to the median across markets. age
refers to the population share in the market above the age of 45, college to the market’s
share of the population with at least a four-year college education, income to the market’s
average household income, and minority to the share of non-whites.
29 The complete empirical distributions by market type are are displayed in Figure W.3 of the Web
Appendix.
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Overall, only 10% of Pennsylvanians are better off under a more flexible pricing such
as the “Product-Specific” markup strategy. In other words, 90% of Pennsylvanians prefer
the current 30% uniform markup and will remain indifferent towards phasing the current
regulation out only if they get compensated an average of $3.62 per customer. This amounts
to approximately 12.8% of average annual expenditure on the PLCB liquor products in our
sample of $28.25, a sizable effect.
Not controlling for other demographics, this effect is most pronounced in high income
markets; the average compensating variation in markets with above-median incomes amounts
to $3.13, compared to $4.17 in below-median income markets, suggesting that high-income
consumers are hurt less than their low-income counterparts. Accordingly, we find that 17.10%
of consumers in high-income markets are better off under “Product-Specific” markup pricing
compared to only 1.8% of consumers in low-income markets. The variation in CV is similarly
high when classifying markets based on the size of their minority population. In markets
with below-median shares of minority consumers, the CV is only $2.82, compared to $4.45
in markets with large minority populations, suggesting that the average minority consumer
requires above average compensation to be indifferent between the two pricing strategies.
Although purely descriptive, in sum our results indicate that while the majority of
households benefit from the current uniform prices, minorities in democratic-leaning districts
are the disproportionate beneficiaries of the current pricing regulation at the expense of
high income and educated households, suggesting a possible role for political economy
considerations in PLCB decision making.
6 Concluding Remarks
Limited systematic evidence exists to evaluate the performance of a public enterprise such as
the PLCB . The current paper focuses its analysis on a behavioral aspect that is commonly
overlooked: the implicit rent redistribution associated with price distortions induced by an
one-size-fits-all policy in the presence of heterogeneous consumers. As such, we study the
intensive margin of regulated alcohol distribution – pricing – and complement related work
by Seim and Waldfogel (2013) who analyze the size of the PLCB ’s store network, or the
extensive margin, as policy tools to affecting alcohol consumption in Pennsylvania.
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We use a rich data set on consumer demand under the current uniform percent markup
policy to study the welfare implications of its pricing policy. Our approach requires the
estimation of a parsimonious discrete choice demand model where demand for liquors depends
on both observable and unobservable product characteristics and where we can account
for many of the important dimensions along which customers differ: income, educational
attainment, and minority status. This model is then used to evaluate the effects of alternative
pricing strategies that the PLCB , following common business practices in private retailing,
could adopt. The model delivers theoretical and empirical results.
First, we show that the current PLCB markup is nearly indistinguishable from the
markup a profit-maximizing, multi-product monopolist would choose. We argue this is due
to the fact that the PLCB likely fails to account for heterogeneity in consumer preferences
and, therefore, incorrectly concludes that the current uniform markup sets prices sufficiently
high to both reduce alcohol consumption and generate revenue for the state.
Second, our evidence indicates that the use of a third degree price discrimination
mechanism does not likely compensate the cost of implementing such a complex strategy.
This piece of evidence, together with others mentioned in the body of the paper, should
influence future theoretical modeling of nonlinear pricing models. There is a current discon-
nect between the abstract models written by theorists, focused on achieving efficiency given
the sources of consumer heterogeneity, and the business practice that makes use of simple
price discrimination mechanisms. This paper presents, to our knowledge, the first empirical
evaluation of the relative performance of several such mechanisms in the case of third-degree
price discrimination.
Third, an important empirical finding that drives much of our counterfactual results is
that the demand for spirits is more elastic for expensive products favored by high income and
educated households than the demand for inexpensive spirits products favored by minorities.
Analyzing substitution patterns we conclude that buyers of expensive spirits can more easily
substitute to similar products or move down to lower quality alternatives. Fewer options,
however, are available for minorities so an increase in the price of their favored product
leads them to leave the market altogether and purchase more distant substitutes such as
beer, inexpensive wines, or sodas. We further document that within liquor categories, spirits
appear to be vertically differentiated.
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Finally, our model delivers the first empirical evaluation of Posner’s regulation-induced
rent redistribution argument. Our results indicate that the current system acts as a tax
mechanism by redistributing rents from higher income and educated consumers towards
lower income and minority consumers. This rent redistribution is certainly an aspect that
is rarely discussed when evaluating the performance of public monopolies like the PLCB .
Interestingly, the cost of the current system falls on a small share of the population and thus
the overwhelming majority of Pennsylvanians would suffer under a less restricted pricing
practice, whether this is carried out by a reformed PLCB or by private companies. In the
latter case, entry of new competitors and opening of new stores may alter the welfare effects
that we study here and may extend beyond the pricing effects we consider.
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Appendix
A Estimation Algorithm
In this Appendix, we provide a step-by-step summary of the estimation algorithm we employ,
which is similar in methodology to BLP , Nevo (2000) and Nevo (2001). It proceeds in two
stages. In the first stage, we characterize each product’s mean utility δjlt as a function of
price, an indicator for whether the time period t overlaps with the end-of-year holiday period,
and product fixed effects. For a given guess at the first-stage parameters θ, we then calculate
the value of the objective function using the following procedure:
1. For each market l and time period t, use θ and the observed market shares to compute
δjlt using the contraction mapping outlined in Appendix I of BLP . In order to ensure
convergence to consistent stable estimates we follow the advice of Dube´, Fox and Su
(2012, §4.2) and set the norm for mean value contraction equal to 1e-14.
2. Construct a vector of mean utilities across markets and time periods, δ = [δ111, ..., δjlt].
3. Regress δ on prices, the holiday indicator, and product fixed effects to recover the mean
price and holiday coefficients α and γ and the joint contribution of xjβ and ξj to mean
utility.
4. Recover the unobserved product characteristic ∆ξjt defined in Equation (8), exploiting
the assumption of the mean zero, i.i.d. distribution of ζjlt.
5. Compute the value of the objective function:
‖ G(θ) ‖= ∆ξ′ZWZ ′∆ξ . (A.1)
We update θ and return to step (1) unless ‖ G ‖ is sufficiently small. In robustness
checks summarized in Table B.1, we include as additional determinants of mean utility an
indicator for state border locations and an indicator for whether the store serving market l
is a premium store.
In the second stage, we project the estimated product fixed effects on the set of
product characteristics xj (i.e., proof, product quality, dummies indicating whether the
product is flavored or imported, and spirit type) by means of a minimum distance estimator.
Second stage standard errors were computed following Nevo (2001).
As commonly noted, finding a global solution to a nonlinear problem such as this is
difficult and any line, gradient, or simplex search will likely only result in a local solution.
– i –
Instead, we employ a simulated annealing algorithm, which is designed to increase the
probability of finding the global minimum. We further looped the estimation over different
initial guesses. First stage standard errors were computed following Adda and Cooper (2003).
B Robustness of Results
Table B.1: Alternative IV Results from Logit Demand
OLS IV
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
price -0.1576*** -0.2056*** -0.2008*** -0.2088*** -0.1906***
(0.0094) (0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0184) (0.0173)
Product Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Premium Stores Y Y N Y Y
Border Stores Y Y Y N Y
Holiday Period Y Y Y Y N
R2 0.982 0.982 0.984 0.982 0.983
Observations 1,104,204 1,104,204 895,443 932,542 923,590
Elasticity Statistics:
Average -2.54 -3.31 -3.19 -3.36 -3.06
Sales-weighted -2.38 -3.10 -2.96 -3.14 -2.86
Median -2.20 -2.88 -2.81 -2.92 -2.67
Standard Deviation 1.11 1.45 1.38 1.47 1.34
Percentage Inelastic 1.94 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.12
Off-Premise Spirit Demand -2.05 -2.67 -2.61 -2.70 -2.51
First Stage:
F − Statistic 20.418 19.566 25.363 19.020
Percentage Significant 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Dependent variable log(Sjmt) − log(S0mt). Robust standard errors in parentheses with p-values
denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. “Percentage Significant” is the percentage
of instruments that are significant in the first-stage at the 5% level. Instruments based on prices
from other states as described in the text. “Off-Premise Spirit Demand” is the price elasticity of
total PLCB spirit sales (750ml bottles).
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Table B.2: Alternative Full Model Demand Estimates
Main No Premium No Border
Specification Stores Stores No Holidays
Mean Utility (α, β)
price -0.1813*** -0.1579*** -0.1940*** -0.1471***
(0.0088) (0.0054) (0.0097) (0.008)
holiday 1.0944*** 0.9877*** 1.5361*** –
(0.0884) (0.0411) (0.0865)
Standard Dev. (σ)
price 0.0015 0.0007 0.0015 0.0094
(0.1145) (0.1002) (0.0605) (0.0138)
constant 0.0138 0.0073** 0.1677 0.0651
(0.1738) (0.0711) (0.1459) (0.0947)
Interactions (Π)
income×constant 2.2958*** 2.6644*** 1.6506*** 2.9963***
(0.1166) (0.0718) (0.2125) (0.0468)
price×income -0.0487*** -0.0593*** -0.0366*** -0.0586***
(0.0190) (0.0114) (0.0178) (0.0123)
education -3.6162*** 0.7116*** -9.7805*** 0.6956***
(0.1610) (0.0906) (0.1393) (0.2057)
minority -0.7471*** -1.5924*** -1.6073*** -0.5955***
(0.1648) (0.0734) (0.1503) (0.1211)
Product Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Premium Stores Y N Y Y
Border Stores Y Y N Y
Holiday Period Y Y Y N
Elasticity Statistics:
Average -3.32 -3.06 -3.35 -2.93
Sales-weighted Avg. -3.11 -2.83 -3.15 -2.75
Percentage Inelastic 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.15
Off-Premise Demand -1.86 -1.84 -1.95 -1.63
χ2 (df) 79.0 (13) 89.1 (13) 74.5 (13) 27.8 (10)
Observations 1,104,204 895,442 932,541 923,474
Markets 9,530 8,282 8,170 8,104
Agents per Market 100 100 100 100
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses with p-values denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and ***
p < 0.01. “Off-Premise Spirit Demand” is the price elasticity of total PLCB spirit sales (750ml bottles).
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C The Upstream Spirit Manufacturing Market
C.1 Wholesale Prices in other Control States Table C.1 compares the wholesale prices of
Pennsylvania to that of other control states. We find there exists large degree of variation in
wholesale price across control states suggesting that it is difficult to systematically compare
the PLCB’s wholesale prices to those in other states – each of which uses a different regulatory
regime.
Table C.1: Wholesale Cost Comparison to Pennsylvania
by Spirit Type and Control State
NC NH OH VT VA
Spirit Type %∆ %∆ > 0 %∆ %∆ > 0 %∆ %∆ > 0 %∆ %∆ > 0 %∆ %∆ > 0
gin -23.38 5.56 -8.46 11.11 -13.63 12.50 7.85 58.33 -12.98 0.00
rum -21.54 0.00 -2.09 30.77 -4.20 22.73 11.92 96.00 -6.68 8.82
tequila -10.46 13.04 -4.13 36.00 2.05 45.45 23.36 93.75 -7.97 12.00
vodka -6.29 1.59 -6.70 16.67 -9.32 28.89 18.91 97.67 1.70 5.36
whiskey -19.46 1.59 -5.12 21.57 -7.47 20.00 11.53 83.33 -8.99 17.74
all products -14.94 3.02 -5.18 22.80 -6.85 25.63 14.81 88.89 -5.75 10.26
Wholesale costs computed using the markup formula and data on shelf prices for each state during 2005.
“%∆” is the average percent difference relative to the PLCB ’s wholesale cost while “%∆ > 0” is percent of
products with greater wholesale cost than Pennsylvania.
C.2 Endogenizing Wholesale Price A concern under each policy experiment may be that
the upstream manufacturers (i.e., the distillers) will negotiate different wholesale prices in
response to the PLCB ’s change in retail price. We check the robustness of our results to a
model in which we allow distillers to modify the wholesale prices (cw) they charge the PLCB
in each policy experiment.
Our approach follows Villas-Boas (2007) to recover marginal costs in the upstream
market where there exists U upstream manufacturers, each producing some subset Fu of the
j = 1, ..., J brands. At the beginning of the year, each upstream manufacturer u chooses the
set of wholesale prices in its product portfolio to maximize profit:
max
{cwj }j∈Fu
∑
j∈FU
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
(cwj − cj)Mlsjlt(p) , (C.1)
where p is the vector of prices chosen by the PLCB under equations (11a) or (11b). Profit
maximization in the upstream market implies that cw solves the following set of first-order
conditions:
cw − c = −(Tw ×∆w)−1s(p) (C.2)
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where we have defined Tw as the upstream ownership matrix with element (j,m) equal to
one when products j and m are both sold by the same manufacturer and is zero otherwise.
The matrix ∆w contains the derivatives of all product sales with respect to changes in
wholesale prices. Consequently, this matrix is complex as it not only accounts substitution
patterns amongst products in response to a change in retail price, but also the interaction
of cross-price elasticities from changes in wholesale costs.
We use the interaction of our data, the demand estimates, and (C.2) to recover
the marginal costs (c) of the distillers from the benchmark estimation. For each policy
experiment, we then solve for the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in which the wholesale prices
(cw) chosen by the distillers under equation (C.2) and the retail markups chosen by the
PLCB under equations (11a) or (11b) are consistent.
Table C.2 presents a summary of the results across policy experiments and Table C.3
presents the change in wholesale price (cw) from the benchmark to the product-specific
pricing experiment. Both tables show that endogenizing the wholesale prices has little
quantitative or qualitative impact.
Table C.2: Counterfactuals Summary Statistics (Flexible Wholesale Prices)
Scenario Profits CS Welfare Quantity Price
30% uniform markup 53.79 57.89 111.68 8.56 15.39
Uniform Π-maximizing markup (32.4%) 54.49 56.01 110.50 8.39 15.54
product-specific 60.49 50.51 111.00 7.82 18.87
3rd degree price discrimination 63.05 49.74 112.79 8.17 18.91
Profits, consumer surplus (CS), and welfare are denominated in millions of dollars. Profits include
liquor taxes. Quantity is millions of 750ml bottles. “Price” is average sales-weighted price.
Table C.3: Changes in Wholesale Price by Spirit Type
Weighted Average Price (cw) Distribution of Price Changes (%)
Spirit Type Current Product Avg SD %∆ > 0
gin 8.57 8.54 -0.20 0.46 43.01
rum 7.22 7.22 -0.07 0.25 44.59
tequila 12.80 12.70 -0.65 0.35 5.28
vodka 9.56 9.52 -0.46 0.38 9.91
whiskey 9.47 9.43 -0.34 0.40 21.90
cheap 6.53 6.51 -0.28 0.47 42.74
expensive 12.42 12.37 -0.39 0.28 3.62
all products 9.12 9.08 -0.33 0.40 22.98
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D Computing Retail Prices
In this Appendix, we provide computational details for the procedures we employ to find the
profit-maximizing prices under alternative PLCB pricing mechanisms. We first consider a
multi-product monopolist’s pricing problem in a given market l and time period t only. The
monopolist solves this same problem for each local market l and time period t. The firm
chooses a vector p·l to solve
max
p·l
∑
j∈Jl
(pjl − cwj )Mlsjl(p·l) , (D.1)
where we suppress the time period index t for ease of exposition.
The firm’s first-order condition associated with profit maximization in market l is
given by
sjl(p·l) +
∑
r∈Jl
(prl − cwr )
∂srl(p·l)
∂pjl
= 0 . (D.2)
Optimality requires that Equation (D.2) hold for all products sold in market l. We express
the set of Jl first-order conditions in matrix notation as
s(p·l) + Ω(p·l − cw) = 0 , (D.3)
where an element of the matrix Ω is defined as
Ωjr =

∂sjl(p·l)
∂prl
, if {j, r} ⊂ Jl ,
0 otherwise .
(D.4)
For a given vector of marginal costs cw, we find the fixed point to the system of equations
defined in Equation (D.3) numerically. To this end, define the following operator
T (po·l) = c
w − Ω−1(po·l)× s(po·l) , (D.5)
where the equilibrium prices are such that pn = T (po). When ‖pn−po‖∞ is sufficiently small,
then the first-order condition defined in Equation (D.3) necessarily holds and pn contains
the set of optimal prices in each market.
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In the “Product-Specific” counterfactual we constrain the monopolist to set prices for
product j that are constant across all markets l. The monopolist then chooses a vector of
prices p to solve
max
p
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈L
(pj − cwj )Mlsjl(p) ≡ max
p
∑
j∈J
(pj − cwj )
∑
l∈L
Mlsjl(p) , (D.6)
which yields the following first-order condition for product j in market l
∑
l∈L
Mlsjl(p) +
[∑
r∈J
(pr − cwr )
∑
l∈L
Ml × ∂srl(p)
∂pj
]
= 0 . (D.7)
Alternatively, in matrix notation
s˜(p) + Ω˜(p− cw) = 0 , (D.8)
where
s˜j(p) =
∑
l∈L
Mlsjl , (D.9a)
Ω˜j(p) =

∑
l∈L
Ml × ∂sjl(p)
∂pr
, if {j, r} ⊂ Jl ,
0 otherwise .
(D.9b)
We again solve for the optimal prices using the operator defined in (D.5).
In the “Uniform Π-max” counterfactual, we employ a grid search to find the value of
λ that maximizes
max
λ∈[0,1]
∑
j∈Jl
∑
l∈L
(pˆj(λ)− cwj )Mlsjl (pˆ) . (D.10)
where
pˆj(λ) =
[
(1 + λ)cwj + $1.20
]× 1.18 ,
holding the PLCB ’s handling charges and liquor tax rate fixed at the current levels.
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Web Appendix – Not for Publication
Table W.1: Correlation Amongst Demographics
Statistic population minority age ≥ 45 yrs high income educ ≥ college
population 1.00 - - - -
minority 0.32 1.00 - - -
age ≥ 45 yrs 0.19 0.34 1.00 - -
high income 0.06 -0.24 -0.32 1.00 -
educ ≥ college 0.05 -0.01 0.08 0.70 1.00
Table W.2: Income Distribution Estimates
Generalized Beta
Statistics a p q b
Mean 2.1 3.0 6346.4 59410.6
SD 5.6 42.1 14022.6 305136.9
Min 0.1 0.0 0.7 34.9
Max 123.9 929.2 228663.0 5997629.5
Summary statistics for a set of 484 maximum-likelihood estimates
of income distributions. We assume that each empirical income
distribution follows a generalized beta distribution with proba-
bility density function:
f(x) = ax
a−p−1
bapB(p,q)[1+( xb )
a]p+q
, x > 0 ,
where B(p, q) = Γ(p)Γ(q)/Γ(p+ q), and Γ(·) is the gamma func-
tion, while a, p, and q are shape parameters and b is a scale
parameter.
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Table W.4: Most Popular Products by Income Decile
Spirit Product Price Share
Bottom Income Decile ($31,020):
1. BACARDI LIGHT-DRY P. R. RUM 12.32 1.77
2. JACK DANIEL’S OLD NO. 7 BLACK LABEL 19.32 1.18
3. ABSOLUT IMP. VODKA - 80 PROOF 18.97 1.16
4. SEAGRAM’S EXTRA DRY GIN 10.78 1.15
5. FIVE O’CLOCK EXTRA DRY GIN 6.07 1.12
6. NIKOLAI VODKA - 90 PROOF 6.85 1.09
7. BACARDI LIMON P. R. RUM 13.67 1.02
8. SMIRNOFF VODKA - 80 PROOF 11.79 0.82
9. JACQUIN’S WHITE RUM 7.99 0.79
10. GREY GOOSE IMP. FRENCH VODKA 26.64 0.77
Average Number of Products: 117.9
Top Income Decile ($74,440):
1. ABSOLUT IMP. VODKA - 80 PROOF 18.97 1.76
2. SMIRNOFF VODKA - 80 PF. PORTABLE 11.84 1.64
3. JACK DANIEL’S OLD NO. 7 BLACK LABEL 19.32 1.54
4. GREY GOOSE IMP. FRENCH VODKA 26.59 1.47
5. KETEL ONE DUTCH VODKA 21.04 1.14
6. SMIRNOFF VODKA - 80 PROOF 11.79 1.08
7. BACARDI LIGHT-DRY P. R. RUM 12.32 1.01
8. JOSE CUERVO ESPECIAL REPOSADO TEQUILA 19.11 0.99
9. SKYY VODKA 15.39 0.92
10. TANQUERAY IMP. DRY GIN 21.99 0.73
Avg. Number of Products: 148.8
Liquor products sorted by share of sales of 750ml bottles of spirits.
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Figure W.1: Retail Price Across Time, Selected Products
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Figure W.3: Distribution of Compensating Variation by Market Demographics
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Figure W.4: Distribution of Price and Market Share:
Product-Specific vs Benchmark Uniform Pricing
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